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Abstract
Securing Email Through Online Social Networks
Atieh Saberi Pirouz
Despite being one of the most basic and popular Internet applications, email still
largely lacks user-to-user cryptographic protections. From a research perspective,
designing privacy preserving techniques for email services is complicated by the re-
quirement of balancing security and ease-of-use needs of everyday users. For example,
users cannot be expected to manage long-term keys (e.g., PGP key-pair), or under-
stand crypto primitives.
To enable intuitive email protections for a large number of users, we design Friend-
lyMail by leveraging existing pre-authenticated relationships between a sender and
receiver on an Online Social Networking (OSN) site, so that users can send secure
emails without requiring direct key exchange with the receiver in advance. Friend-
lyMail can provide integrity, authentication and confidentiality guarantees for user-
selected messages among OSN friends. FriendlyMail is mainly based on splitting the
trust without introducing new trusted third parties. A confidentiality-protected email
is encrypted by a randomly-generated key and sent through email service providers,
while the key and hash of the encrypted content are privately shared with the receiver
via the OSN site as a second secure channel. Our implementation consists of a Firefox
addon and a Facebook application, and can secure the web-based Gmail service using
Facebook as the OSN site. However, the design can be implemented for preferred
email/OSN services as long as the email and OSN providers are non-colluding par-
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In this chapter, we discuss our motivation for this thesis and summarize our contri-
butions.
1.1 Motivation
Billions of emails are sent everyday, with almost all of them being stored/available in
plaintext to one or multiple third parties, e.g., email service providers, ISPs, and wifi
hotspot providers. Imagine the outrage that would have erupted if a large paper-mail
provider such as the U.S. Postal Service would have opened and kept a scanned copy of
every mail/document they processed. Yet, today’s email users are apparently finding
it acceptable that a few email providers have complete access to their most intimate
messages. (The CEOs of Sun Microsystems, Google and Facebook remarked at var-
ious times that “privacy is dead”). This is a fantastic development that happened
within the span of only a few decades. Apparently, century-old privacy expectations
of personal communication have just evaporated into thin air.
We believe the current situation is the result of several factors, including the
following. (a) Most people are unaware that their emails are not private at all.
The email infrastructure (e.g., ISPs, email providers) are more or less transparent to
average users. When sending an email, or any message for that matter, users have
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the illusion that they are sending the email directly to the recipient. Some experts
identify this situation as web service providers (e.g., Facebook) being a transparent
man-in-the-middle (see e.g., [46]). (b) A wide-spread, common misconception among
users is “I’ve got nothing to hide” [78]. Most users apparently believe their emails
or other messages are not very sensitive or interesting to service providers; i.e., users
may take precautions not to disclose an email to their family and friends, but they
do not believe that large corporations like Google or Facebook would be interested
to dig in their personal lives. So, even if some users understand that their emails
are accessible to service providers, they do not feel the necessity to explore privacy-
friendly alternatives. (c) The inadequacy of existing email security solutions.
Without the availability of effective solutions, issues in (a) and (b) cannot possi-
bly be addressed, e.g., just asking people not to send anything sensitive via email is
a non-solution. PGP is one of the pioneer solutions enabling adequate security fea-
tures for emails (e.g., confidentiality, authentication, integrity). Unfortunately, even
though PGP has been available for over two decades now, most emails are still sent
unencrypted. Other proposals also emerged, e.g., STEED [48], Waterhouse [50] and
Aquinas [10]. Most solutions require a certain level of technical understanding for
proper use (e.g., the idea of public key systems); later work has identified several
shortcomings when these tools are used by everyday people (e.g., [87, 76, 82]). The
end result, so far, is that the adoption of these techniques remains consistently low.
1.2 Thesis Statement
The primary objective of this thesis is to address security and privacy challenges of
email services as faced by everyday Internet users. As part of this goal, I will explore
the following research questions:
Question 1. Can we design novel privacy-preserving architectures and tech-
niques for popular email services given that users will continue using these free ser-
vices?
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Question 2. Can we integrate usable security/privacy mechanisms with the
functioning of the existing (privacy-unfriendly) systems without introducing a new
service?
This dissertation explores new directions in privacy research to enable usable pri-
vacy friendly emails by leveraging existing services, and strengthen existing research
on online message privacy in general. Another important focus of this research is to
increase awareness and understanding of email privacy issues among everyday users.
1.3 Summary of Our Proposal
We propose FriendlyMail , a secure email technique designed for everyday users. To
achieve security goals, FriendlyMail leverages widely popular, frequently-used online
social networking (OSN) services, e.g., Facebook. We assume senders and receivers
are connected through OSN sites (e.g., as Facebook friends). A sender-side addon
creates a per-message symmetric key to encrypt the email content; a cryptographic
hash of the encrypted message is also generated. When confidentiality is unwanted
and instead, the goals are to authenticate the sender via a second (secure) channel
and to verify the integrity of the email content, a hash of the plaintext message is
created. The hash/key values are then published on the OSN site, which are instantly
accessible only to the receiver, e.g., on the sender’s Facebook wall, or as a private
Twitter message, etc. An addon in the recipient’s email client (stand-alone or browser
addon) is configured to access the hash and message key; the addon verifies the hash
and decrypts the email content (if encrypted). The receiver is assured of the email’s
integrity from the result of the hash verification; the sender’s authenticity is verified
implicitly by the OSN site, as the hash/key values are accessible only to the receiver
through the pre-existing social relationship. Confidentiality is maintained by the
per-message encryption key.
Obviously, FriendlyMail requires the email and OSN sites to be non-colluding
entities. We use existing OSN sites as a key transport method to simplify the key
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sharing and verification process, which has been identified as an important barrier to
PGP’s adoption [87]. Our hope is that FriendlyMail’s design leads to better adoption
rates among regular users than existing public-key based solutions. FriendlyMail
is designed and implemented considering web-based Gmail and Facebook services;
however, it can be extended to other email clients/services, and be used with other
OSN services. Note that there are about 425 million Gmail users [68] (as of June
2012) and 1.11 billion monthly active Facebook users [22] (as of March 2013).
1.4 Contributions
Following the above discussion, the main contributions of this dissertation towards
securing emails are as follows.
1. FriendlyMail takes advantage of existing user practices (i.e., the use of OSN)
to make popular email services more privacy-friendly. We expect this design
choice to increase adoption rates, as it can reach a significant portion of web
users.
2. No changes to the server-side of the social networking sites or email providers
are needed. Therefore, users can immediately benefit from FriendlyMail.
3. To facilitate gradual adoption, FriendlyMail allows a sender to indicate which
emails should have integrity and confidentiality protections. Default encryption
of all emails would be a more privacy-preserving design choice; however, such a
design may not work for many users (due to e.g., not using OSN).
4. Unlike most other solutions, FriendlyMail does not require the receiver of a
confidential email to create keying materials (as in public key systems) before
she can receive such emails. The only pre-requisite for the sender to initiate a
confidential email exchange is to be friends with the receiver in a common OSN.
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5. In addition to email privacy, FriendlyMail can provide email integrity and origin
authentication between parties with weak pre-existing OSN relationships (e.g.,
Facebook Like). When the sender and receiver have no previous contact, in-
tegrity is perhaps more important than confidentiality. Integrity protection can
be enabled without any OSN relationships. Past work generated some theoret-
ical proposal in this area, e.g., public corroboration [84]. FriendlyMail extends
such work so that it can be deployed in reality and used by common email users.
6. To evaluate the feasibility of our design, we have implemented FriendlyMail
for the web-based Gmail interface using Facebook as the OSN provider. Basic
email features between two users, e.g., message compose, send, receive, reply,
and forward have been implemented.
7. FriendlyMail has carefully been integrated with Gmail UI to reduce disrup-
tion to regular email use. Some features are still in progress, including multi-
party/group email, attachments, etc.
1.5 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related work regard-
ing existing email security standards and proposals. Chapter 3 provides our threat
model and assumptions. We propose FriendlyMail email security solution and detail
its design in Chapter 4. Implementation details of FriendlyMail and some variants to
FriendlyMail are also presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, attacks on FriendlyMail
based on our presented threat model are analyzed. We also discuss several usability
and deployment issues of FriendlyMail. Chapter 7 discusses some conclusions of this
thesis and future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we briefly discuss few email security mechanisms. Then we go through
several related proposals.
Security for emails using cryptography can be provided in various ways. Signature
schemes are used for authentication and integrity verification. Encryption mecha-
nisms such as symmetric, public key encryption are generally used to achieve email
confidentiality. Other proposals incorporate steganography to avoid secret sharing
and the existence of confidential emails. Considering a network adversary, confiden-
tiality protection of the message body and header can also be provided by encrypting
the client-to-mail server and mail server-to-mail server connections, e.g., using TLS.
Numerous proposals for email integrity and confidentiality have been put forward.
Some designs are completely client-side. Thus, users are in the control of their email
encryption. Installation of additional software or plug-in is also required. Moreover,
interoperability is a known issue for client side end-to-end approaches. Other de-
signs employ third party servers, to take the burden of key management away from
users (e.g., Enlocked [20]). Therefore, they cannot offer a complete end-to-end en-
cryption, as they have access to the encryption keys and email contents. Encrypted
communications between different email providers also do not always guarantee end-
to-end confidentiality. TLS for the same service is safe from network attacker, but not
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against the email provider itself. TLS protected emails may still be unsafe from net-
work attacker, if either of the sender’s or receiver’s email service is not TLS-protected.
Moreover, there is no way to make sure that every hop on the email’s route to the
receiver’s inbox, has also TLS enabled.
Several email security standards have been introduced. Privacy Enhanced Mail
(PEM [53]) and MIME Object Security Services (MOSS [15]) are introduced in 1987
and 1995 respectively, which were never widely deployed or implemented. Currently,
PGP/OpenPGP (RFC 4880 [1]) and S/MIME (RFC 2634 [72]) are the most widely
used standards, that can provide end-to-end email security. In the following sections
we discuss some standards and related proposals, but exclude enterprise solutions as
they are unsuitable for zero-cost mass deployment. The evaluation and comparison
of discussed schemes are presented in details in Section A.2
2.1 PKI-Based Approaches
2.1.1 PGP/OpenPGP
OpenPGP(RFC 4880 [1]) is a standard based on PGP, originally developed by Phillip
R. Zimmermann in 1991. To provide non-reputation and message authenticity (origin
and content integrity verification), it employs hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA-1) and
signature algorithms to digitally sign email bodies and data files. Confidentiality is
also provided through the use of a combination of symmetric (e.g., IDEA, CAST)
and public key cryptography (e.g., RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elgamal). Each PGP user
generates a key pair (public/private) and must share his/her public key with other
PGP users before starting PGP confidential communications. There is no actual key
distribution mechanism in PGP; public keys can be exchanged using, e.g., email,
personal web pages, meet in person. Each user should also verify the identity and
public key (fingerprint) of other users using, e.g., phone or meet in person. Key
distribution and verification using above mentioned methods are not appropriate for
large communities with unknown users. Thus, public keys can also be shared through
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a key server. However, key distribution via key servers still does not guarantee that a
key belongs to the intended person, as anyone can create and publish a key on these
key servers using any identifier. To deal with this issue, PGP introduced the Web of
Trust model, which is discussed below.
The process of encrypting an email using PGP is as follows. Email content is first
compressed to save transmission time. It is then encrypted using a one-time-only
random session key (symmetric key). The session key is then encrypted using the
sender’s public key and is sent along with the encrypted email to the sender. The
receiver decrypts the session key, using his own private key, to be able to decrypt
the received email. To provide message authenticity, the hash of the email content
is calculated and digitally signed using the sender’s private key and is accompanied
with the email content. Using the sender’s public key, the receiver verifies the sender’s
signature on the message digest. If both confidentiality and message authenticity are
desired, the signature is first generated, after applying compression on the signature
and email content, the result is encrypted as the last step. Different PGP versions
use different algorithms during each process (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, IDEA, CAST, RSA,
Diffie-Hellman).
PGP trust model. Compared to previous email security standards, PGP trust
model does not require a centralized PKI with a single root or any trusted third
parties as certificate authorities to sign the certificates and enable trust among users.
Instead, each user can act as a CA and certify other users’ public keys and identi-
ties. Therefore, instead of one signature, there can be multiple signatures on PGP
certificates. The signer of a certificate can also indicate his/her level of trust on the
owner of the certificate to express his/her trust in a user as a voucher for other users’
certificate authenticity. This form of decentralized trust model in which users recom-
mend each others’ certificates is called Web of Trust. On the plus side, Web of Trust
is similar to how trust is established in the real life. Therefore, it may seem closer to
the user’s mental model compared to other trust models. Although, it still has few
downsides. This trust model does not completely match the user’s mental model, as
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users may certify other users, whom they may not know directly beforehand; and as
the circle of communications grows, there is no actual accountability of trustworthi-
ness on users’ certificate, as their owners are not in a close circle. Moreover, trust is
based on others’ recommendations than the user experience with certificates during
communications over time [48].
PGP shortcomings. In addition to its trust model issues, PGP has several limi-
tations. Key management is considered as a big challenge in PGP and PKI-based
solutions in general. Public key cryptography requires the sender to obtain the re-
ceiver’s public key beforehand, to be able to start any PGP encrypted communication
(also it should be done in a secure way to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks). More-
over, there is still no practical secure approach to private key management; users
should create a backup of their private key, store it in a safe place and be careful
not to loose it, otherwise old encrypted emails cannot be decrypted anymore. Ad-
ditionally, in case the private key is compromised, the attacker can trivially decrypt
all the (old or new) encrypted emails. Therefore, a certificate revocation list (CRL)
is required to facilitate the revocation of all compromised keys which also must be
shared with all users. Key revocation prevents the attacker from having access to the
encrypted emails in the future. However, key revocation brings the same usability
problem regarding key distribution and also requires consistent updates.
Other usability problems of PGP software (PGP 5) regarding the user interface
have been discussed in detail by Whitten and Tygar [87]. The result of their user
study and cognitive walkthrough on PGP 5 also suggests that the desired security
level of the PGP software has not achieved due to usability problems. Some users
could not figure out the concept of PKI and did not know which key to use to encrypt
their email. Those who had knowledge about PKI, still had difficulty to find out how
they can get a key for the receiver. Also, one user accidentally sent a sensitive email
in the clear, while she thought it had already been encrypted. In another usability
study on PGP 9 [75], key verification is considered confusing; users could not figure
out that in order to verify a key they need to sign it. Unlike PGP 5, users had so much
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difficulty with digital signatures in PGP 9 due to the absence of a cue in the interface,
representing signing emails. Transparent encryption is also found problematic when
there is no feedback to the user if an email will be encrypted or not. Additionally,
when emails are automatically decrypted spoofing attacks may not be noticeable to
all users; and users should compare and verify the key presented in the email, with
the one existed in PGP.
Unlike S/MIME, major email clients including Microsoft Outlook, IBM Lotus
Notes, and Mozilla Thunderbird do not directly support PGP. However, PGP can be
enabled by adding an additional add-on or plug-in to the mail client. Compared to
other email security standards, PGP has been adopted or improved by some email
security tools and other proposals. The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a free
implementation of OpenPGP. GPG and OpenPGP have been incorporated by several
tools. For example, Enigmail [56] is an extension to the Mozilla Thunderbird and
Seamonkey. It provides encryption and signing using OpenPGP. To secure emails,
one should install OpenPGP in addition to the Enigmail extension. To eliminate
the need for installing PGP on user’s machine, OpenPGP has been implemented
for browsers in JavaScript, so that it can be used in other applications and plug-ins
as an open-source library [65]. GMail-crypt [73] and GPG4Browsers [33] are also
chrome extensions to the Gmail interface and enable email security using OpenPGP
JavaScript library. Other proposals based on PGP are discussed in detail in the
following sections.
2.1.2 PGP-based Proposals
Waterhouse. Waterhouse [50] is proposed to secure existing email clients using
PGP. It uses OSN sites such as Facebook to distribute long-term public-keys, by
posting them on OSN profiles and to leverage existing OSN connections between
users. However, the burden of managing private keys remains on end users; which is
still an open problem that negatively impacts PKI-based approaches in general.
For intuitive identity verification, Waterhouse suggests displaying a sender’s OSN
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photo with each email (cf. Facemail [52]). As the sender’s photo alone cannot guar-
antee trustworthiness of the OSN profile owner (due to the existence of fake account
impersonating OSNs’ users), the use of a Web of Trust (WoT) model is also suggested;
only public keys of senders with at least n friends in common with the receiver are
accepted.
All outgoing messages are signed even in the absence of any connection on the
OSN. However, to have a confidential communication, senders and receivers must be
friends in the targeted OSN site. Their current prototype has been integrated into an
open-source, web-based email client. No implementation of this proposal is available
(as far as we are aware of).
Stream. Stream [36] is a POP and SMTP proxy that sits between the email client
and server. To remove all user involvement and elevate the usability, Stream offers
no user interface; all emails are encrypted using PGP at the SMTP proxy, when the
receiver’s public key is available (opportunistic encryption), otherwise they are sent
in the clear. Stream [37] also provides users with an option, by which if the subject
line contains mandatory encryption character, and the recipients’ public keys could
not be found, the email is sent back to the sender, explaining that the email could
not be encrypted for those recipients.
At the sender side, Stream grabs the message right after leaving the sender’s inbox
and before reaching to the SMTP mail server. It then uses sender’s email address
as an index to locate the associated key pair in the key database; If no key pairs
are found, public/private keys are automatically generated and stored on the fly by
the proxy. Stream offers opportunistic key distribution by signing each recipient’s
public key and adding it to each email’s header. At the receiver side, the POP proxy
verifies the sender’s public key, decrypts and delivers the email. If a new public key is
detected for an existing email address, the receiver is notified through an email. The
public key is then added to the user’s database.
Stream eases the burden of key management but requires users to trust its proxy
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servers with private keys that can decrypt any email at any time without users’ knowl-
edge; such a trust model is particularly unsuitable for webmail providers. Moreover,
opportunistic encryption used in Stream may disclose sensitive email content, in the
case when the receiver’s public key cannot be found and the email is sent unencrypted,
without any feedback to the user. Stream does not come up with any solution ad-
dressing man-in-the-middle attacks, as public keys are sent along with the encrypted
messages. If a public key is replaced by an attacker and all of the outgoing messages
are modified by the attacker, the attack could not be noticeable to the receiver.
STEED. STEED [48] employs a set of existing techniques to address usability prob-
lems of PGP and S/MIME, including non-user friendly trust models. To reduce
the user involvement, it proposes significant changes to email providers and Mail
User Agents (MUAs). MUAs would automatically generate public/private keys (or
self-signed certificates) each time a new email account is created, and perform oppor-
tunistic encryption using GPG. Key/certificate distribution is done through the DNS
server of an email provider. Compared to key servers, DNS is decentralized, available
and its structure also matches email addresses that can be used to bind the user’s
identity with a certificate. Incorporating DNS also brings the benefit of the improved
security using DNSSEC. This feature provides a secure channel for key/certificate
distribution which prevents man-in-the-middle attacks.
Users are still responsible for managing their private keys. They believe there
should be a Personal Information Manager (PIM), protecting all the user’s sensitive
information (e.g., phone numbers, address books, mail account, etc.) in addition to
passphrases. Although in the absence of a promising solution, a temporary solution
is needed.
STEED’s proposed trust model is based on “trust upon first contact” and “per-
sistency of pseudonym” (TUFC/POP). In this model, keys/certificates are accepted
in the first contact, and then verified during further communications. Users can ver-
ify suspicious certificates at the first contact, through an out-of-band channel, e.g.,
phones or meet in person. After trust is established, the system helps users to track
12
any suspicious changes made into trusted certificates.
2.1.3 S/MIME
The process toward securing emails in S/MIME (RFC 2634 [72]) is similar to the
one used in OpenPGP and they both use digital certificates for key management.
S/MIME users obtain a X.509 digital certificate including the user’s identity, public
key, expiration date and, etc. As S/MIME also uses asymmetric encryption, it has
many of PGP limitations. In addition to the PKI-related issues in PGP and S/MIME
(e.g., key management), obtaining certificates from well-known CAs with actual iden-
tity verification is costly and time consuming. It also requires additional effort and
submission of personal information to CAs, which some users may be reluctant to
do [76, 51]. Self-signed certificates may seem user-friendly, however they bring their
own security risks and usability issues [38].
S/MIME is built into most popular desktop email clients, e.g., Microsoft’s Out-
look and Mozilla Thunderbird, but is not supported by web-based email clients, e.g.,
Gmail and Hotmail. However, usability issues of S/MIME specifically regarding its
trust model, make it unusable in practice. CoPilot [76] is proposed based on Key con-
tinuity management (KCM [42]), to address usability issues of identity certification
and automate key management in S/MIME. Instead of concerning about the certifi-
cate authenticity of each secure incoming email, the sender’s S/MIME certificate is
automatically accepted for the first time (as key certification used in SSH) and a new
digital ID is generated to be associated with the email address. Copilot then keeps
track of further emails sent from the same email address and notifies users about
any changes made to the digital ID, associated with each email address, through the
use of different background colors and presented information. For example, if a se-
cure email is received from a new address for the first time, it is flagged as yellow.
Further digitally signed emails sent from the same address are shown within a green
background; CoPilot also counts the number of emails that has been sent with the
same email address and digital ID. If an incoming email from the same address has a
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different certificate (digital ID), it is shown within a red background and, etc. CoPi-
lot does not guarantee any trustworthiness; it is on users to decide whether to trust
a new or changed digital ID or not. Despite all efforts toward having simpler trust
model for S/MIME, complexity of public key cryptography concept, and some user
interface related usability problems of email clients supporting S/MIME (discussed
in a recent work [35]), are still barriers to S/MIME’s adoption. Since S/MIME is
not broadly used due to the above mentioned problems, we do not discuss further
S/MIME related proposals.
2.1.4 IBE-based Proposals
Identity-based encryption (IBE) was initially introduced by Adi Shamir [74] in 1984
to reduce the issues of public key management. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [7]
proposed a practical IBE solution with an actual application for email encryption.
IBE is based on public key cryptography. However, unlike PGP and S/MIME, pub-
lic/private keys are not randomly generated by users themselves. Public keys are
derived from the arbitrary, unique and publicly available user identifiers, e.g., email
address. No certificate or public key exchange is required. Moreover, email communi-
cation through IBE is not limited to those who have their own public key in advance;
senders can send encrypted emails to the receivers who does not have a public key. A
trusted third party key server, called Private Key Generator (PKG), generates its own
master public/private keys and publishes its own corresponding master public key.
The sender encrypts emails using the receiver’s unique information and the PKG’s
master public key. On the receiver side, the receiver retrieves his own private key
from PKG, after authenticating himself to PKG and decrypts the email. Voltage
Security [85], Trend micro [83] and FortiMail [34], all offer enterprise email security
solutions through IBE. Therefore, we do not discuss them further.
One problem arises from using unique identity information as the public key, in
which if the corresponding private key is compromised, there is no substitution to
the unique identity information to be able to easily revoke the public key. Therefore,
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a time period is also added to the public key. Public keys are then automatically
expired and revoked after a specific duration of time. Moreover, one concern about
IBE is the ability of PKG to access original content of encrypted emails, as it is in
possession of all users’ private keys. In contrast to PGP and S/MIME, private keys
are generated on demand by PKG and are shared with the user through a secure
channel. Therefore, in addition to the security of PKG servers, trust in PKG servers
is also of great importance. In the following, we discuss a proposal which addresses
the aforementioned problems.
Lightweight Encryption for Email. In their previous work, Adida et al. [2] pro-
pose using each email domain as a PKG to provide email authentication using IBE.
Each email domain distributes its own MPKs (Master Public Keys) through the Do-
main Name Server (DNS). Each user’s secret key is directly delivered to their inbox
using email-based authentication. In another proposal [3], Adida et al. extend their
approach to provide email encryption using IBE, based on their previous proposals
of key distribution through DNS servers.
Their proposal exposes users to two potential privacy issues. First, storing the
MSK (Master Secret Key) on a single DNS server, leaves the server vulnerable to
malicious attacks by external attackers. By compromising a DNS maintaining the
MSK, the attacker can trivially generate all users’ private keys from the MSK. To
mitigate the problem, Adida et al. perform the key generation distribution among
several DNS servers instead of one server. Thus, in order to compromise users’ private
keys, the attacker should compromise all PKGs to combine all MSK’s shares.
Second, an email provider can easily gather all the shared MSKs from all DNS
servers, combine them together to generate the final MSKs and obtain all users’
private keys. Therefore, Adida et al. further introduce two countermeasures to this
problem. Their main approach is to incorporate two separate channels for key sharing:
email providers’ DNS as and a user preferred channel. Therefore, they put users in
charge of generation and distribution of their own key pairs by the means of any
online medium, such as personal web pages; and users can be in possession of their
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own key pairs which cannot be accessible by email providers. However, this approach
suffers from usability issues regarding publishing user generated key shares. It also
introduces the same key loss problem as in PGP and S/MIME. Alternatively, two
different email providers can be used to send an encrypted email. The way it works
is to first encrypt emails using the recipient’s public key, published on the first email
DNS server, then encrypt the generated ciphertext using the recipient’s public key
stored on the second email domain. The latter solution, prevents each domain from
decrypting the email, as they are not in possession of both private keys at the same
time.
2.2 Symmetric Encryption and Trust Split Based
Proposals
Aquinas. Aquinas [10] employs symmetric encryption with per-email keys, and thus
avoids several key management issues. An implementation of Aquinas as an open-
source Java applet enables confidentiality through AES encryption, deniability using
a steganography technique (SNOW) to hide confidential email communications, and
message integrity using MAC. Keys and encrypted messages are split, and transmitted
separately through competitor email providers; so that a compromised account would
not reveal the secret message to the attacker. At the receiver side, all shares are
combined to regenerate the original message and keys.
A malicious ISP may collect all key/message shares and retrieve the message,
when user to email channels are not SSL-protected. SSL protected channels prevent
from revealing the content of transmitted messages, yet cannot hide the source and
destination of the packets. Therefore the ISP learns all the involved email providers
and colludes with them. To restrict this attack, several solutions have been proposed,
including the use of proxies or different email accounts for sending different emails. As
another solution, additional email accounts are added to communicate bogus message
shares; e.g., 20 out of 40 shares may be used for the actual message. The ISP now
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sees all 40 shares, but does not know which ones would construct the real message.
The sender and receiver must communicate an initial secret that will be used to
determine the shares for the real message; this secret should be established through
an out-of-band mechanism (e.g., phone).
A publicly available directory is also suggested to maintain all users’ email ac-
counts. This publicly available directory would not reveal any information to the
attacker, as the subset of these accounts is still unknown, yet a public directory of
users’ email accounts endangers users’ privacy to some extent. Another concern could
be the need of user authentication when a new email account is added to the list,
otherwise an adversary can impersonate a user by supplying fake email accounts, and
trick other users to send their key and message shares to the fake account.
TrustSplit. TrustSplit [30] proposes the confidentiality as a service (CaaS) paradigm,
and splits the trust between a cloud provider (e.g., Gmail, Dropbox) and CaaS
provider(s) to secure users’ data before sharing through the cloud, and manage keys
transparently. To benefit from CaaS, users should first register for the service and
create a new CaaS account. Users are required to provide an email address and a
password, which should be different than the cloud service’s password to enable CaaS
to authenticate users and bind their newly created CaaS accounts to their existing
cloud service ones. To protect user data from CaaS provider, multiple layers of com-
mutative encryption are used, called cLayers, which can be added/removed from user
data in an arbitrary order.
The hash value of Alice’s data is first computed. Alice’s data is then encrypted
(AES in counter mode) with a local layer (+cLayerLocalPre), by XORing (⊕) the
original data with a key stream of the same size and sent to the CaaS provider. If
Alice is authenticated successfully and all the recipients are CaaS users, CaaS provider
applies an additional layer of encryption (+cLayerRemote), and returns the result to
Alice. The local layer is removed (-cLayerLocalPre) by the client and data encrypted
with the CaaS remote cLayer is shared via the cloud provider with the intended
recipients.
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When the encrypted data is received, Bob adds his local cLayer (+cLocalLay-
erPost), and then sends the data and the list of recipients to the CaaS provider.
CaaS provider removes the remote cLayer (-cLayerRemote) and returns the data to
Bob. Now, Bob’s local cLayer is removed to reveal the plaintext (-cLayerLocalPost).
TrustSplit requires third parties to run CaaS servers; users also must register with
these services. The service has been implemented to secure Dropbox, Facebook and
Mozilla Thunderbird. The general approach is the same for all, but slightly different in
case of Dropbox and email attachments. In these cases, the above mentioned process
is done on the symmetric key, used for encrypting the whole data or email attach-
ments instead of the whole data or attachment itself. Their current implementation
for email security is an extension to Thunderbird, written using Greasemonkey [41]
script to provide encryption and decryption on client side.
SPEmail. In another attempt of eliminating usability issues of public key cryptogra-
phy used in email security, SPEmail [66] uses secret sharing and linguistic steganog-
raphy to provide confidentiality for webmails. Therefore no key setup, exchange or
management is needed. Each message is divided into two shares. After encoding
secret shares by applying a form of text steganography based on Huffman coding of
Markov graph, secret shares are delivered via two different webmail providers. These
providers should be located in countries with different legislations to prevent collusion.
SPEmail does not provide sender authentication or message integrity. In addition, no
approach for searching among secret shares has been suggested. SPEmail, has cur-
rently been implemented as a Greasemonkey script in a Firefox extension, securing
Gmail web client. Although the tool is out-dated and cannot be tested.
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Chapter 3
Threat Model and Assumptions
In this chapter, we first explain FriendlyMail’s defined levels of trust relationships
on OSNs. We also discuss FriendlyMail’s assumptions and threat model, categorized
into in-scope and out-of-scope threats.
3.1 Trust Relationships and Protections
FriendlyMail can provide different levels of cryptographic guarantees such as message
authentication, integrity and confidentiality depending on user choice and the (exist-
ing) trust relationships between the sender and receiver on OSNs. We assume the
following trust relationships:
(a) a direct OSN connection between a sender and receiver (e.g., Facebook friends),
where both parties know each other to some extent (e.g., real-life relations, online-
only acquaintances).
(b) indirect OSN personal connections (e.g., Facebook friends-of-friends), where the
sender and receiver are related via one or more direct acquaintances.
(c) impersonal OSN connections with web presences of known physical/online en-
tities, e.g., users connected to a Facebook page (e.g., of a bank, organization,
entertainer) possibly through the Like feature.
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(d) unconnected.
Table 1 summarizes FriendlyMail protections for these relationships. Different (exist-
ing) OSN trust relationships have different levels of authentication strength. Friendly-
Mail mainly provides email content confidentiality based on (existing) strong authen-
tication in friends’ circle. However, confidentiality protection can be extended to the
lower levels of authentication strength (e.g., among friends-of-friends; see Section 4.4
under “User authentication”). Note that, there is a trade-off between providing email
content confidentiality based on indirect connections beyond the friends’ circle, and
increasing the risk of spam or malicious emails. This is due to the existence of fake
accounts and the lack of a proper and effective supervision on the users’ actual iden-
tity on the OSN (see Section 6.1 item 6). However, email content integrity does not
require prior direct connections on the OSN between sender and receiver. We also
assume trust relationships e.g., OSN connections (or lack thereof) can be determined
based on available information in email clients. For example, the receiver’s email
address or full-name can be searched in the sender’s OSN friends’ list to verify if they
have a direct connection. This verification may require the receiver to be registered
with the same email address or full-name for the OSN account.
Trust relationships
Protections provided
Origin authentication Integrity Confidentiality
Direct strong X X
Indirect weak X X
Impersonal weak X
Unconnected X
Table 1: FriendlyMail protections for different OSN trust relationships. An empty box
indicates the stated protection is not provided.
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3.2 In-scope Threats
We assume the adversary is capable of performing the following attacks.
1. We assume a Dolev-Yao [17, 60] network adversary. Network connections be-
tween users and OSN/email servers are also assumed to be protected (e.g., via
SSL).
2. As a sender, the adversary may impersonate a friend, i.e., the adversary is aware
of the user’s social contacts, or a known company (e.g., the user’s bank); i.e., the
FROM field can be arbitrary, and we do not assume any other sender verification
techniques being used (e.g., Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [55]/DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) [16]).
3. The adversary may compromise the credential of a FriendlyMail user’s email
account. At the sender side, she may try to abuse FriendlyMail to send malicious
emails, in the form of trusted ones, through the compromised email account. She
also has access to the email content residing on the inbox of the compromised
email account.
4. Email providers are non-malicious but possibly curious, motivated (e.g., finan-
cially) or forced by law enforcement to have access to or reveal users’ email
content.
3.3 Out-of-scope Threats
In the following, we briefly go through out-of-scope threats and several assumptions
required by FriendlyMail to function properly.
1. With regards to the email content, we assume that the email and OSN providers
are non-malicious but curious entities; i.e., they will provide their services in
the usual manner, but would prefer to learn the email content (e.g., for ad-
vertisements, building elaborate user profiles). Besides, the email and OSN
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providers must be separate, non-colluding entities, ideally residing in different
legal jurisdictions. Note that, for cloud storage/application services, defining
legal boundaries may be tricky; see e.g., Hoboken et al. [45], for how U.S. laws
(Patriot Act/FISA) can be used to access user data in EU countries. Either of
the service providers may cooperate with an adversary, but not both.
2. To prevent perpetual access to an email content, users can delete keys from the
OSN site after an encrypted message has been retrieved, or after a given time
period. However, OSN sites may not actually delete any posts for a long period
of time; see, e.g., Facebook policy on deleted content [28]. Thus, an encrypted
email is not guaranteed to remain confidential forever, assuming currently non-
cooperating email and OSN providers may collude at some point in the future.
Hence, message self-destruction is a non-goal (which is rather difficult to achieve,
cf. [88]).
3. We use the OSN provider for sender origin authentication, and assume that
OSN profiles and connections between users are largely genuine. For example,
Facebook actively attempts to control (prevent or detect) fake profiles by enforc-
ing a policy [26] (regarding, e.g., multiple account creation and providing false
personal information); or keeping track of its users actions and behaviours [70]
to detect fake accounts. However, such profiles are still a significant concern (see
e.g., [6, 9]). Detecting fake accounts is also an active research area (e.g., [11]).
Therefore, users are always advised to take precautions to distinguish between
fake accounts and genuine ones, when it comes to accepting a friend request on
OSNs [71]. We assume that users are aware of this threat and act cautiously
when adding friends.
4. FriendlyMail requires that OSNs enforce proper access control mechanisms to
maintain their site integrity and take several actions toward making the OSN
a secure environment. Access control mechanisms are designed to only allow
authorized users to add or delete content to their OSN account. Several security
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features are also introduced to detect and decrease account hijacking (e.g., two
factor authentication, remote log out, HTTPS support, social reporting in case
of Facebook) [25, 69]. Additionally, in our threat model, OSN providers are not
malicious in a sense that they do not add or delete any content on behalf of users.
Social networking service provider’s malicious behaviours have been discussed
in [32] and these attacks regarding OSN provider’s malicious behaviours are out
of FriendlyMail scope. These two assumptions are critical for considering an
OSN as a second (secure) channel for sharing keys/hash values and as a means
of asserting that the user is authenticated.
5. We require that the OSN providers can protect confidentiality and integrity of
user posts, e.g., not to expose privately posted keys/hashes to unauthorized
parties (but see [18]).
6. Both the sender and receiver-end machines are assumed to be malware-free;
otherwise, malware can simply expose or modify the email content when being
composed/read.
7. The user’s email and OSN account credentials must not be compromised. By
compromising the user’s OSN account, the adversary is in the control of the
content, stored on the OSN and can add, remove or change them. Also, if she
has access to both keys and encrypted emails it is trivial for her to get the
original content of the emails. We discuss consequences of such compromises in
Section 6.1.
8. The recipient of a confidential email is also trusted not to share the content




In this chapter, we describe the overview of FriendlyMail. We present the different
modes of FriendlyMail operation and detail FriendlyMail and user steps for send-
ing/receiving confidential and integrity-protected emails. Parts of these steps are
explained through our prototype for Gmail and Facebook (detailed in Chapter 5).
We also elaborate in detail the reasons of certain choices we made.
4.1 Design Overview
In contrast to PKI-based approaches, FriendlyMail opts for a simple solution, using
symmetric encryption and integration with OSNs, to provide email confidentiality,
origin and content integrity verification. The design is related to the well-established
notion of using multiple channels for security (e.g., [89, 54]). FriendlyMail employs
OSN sites, as an additional channel, mainly to automate key management and in-
tegrity verification process; while secure emails are communicated over email providers
as the main channel. It leverages existing pre-authenticated connections among users
on the OSN, to address the challenge of exchanging secrets between email senders
and receivers. OSNs also serve as secure channels for sharing hash values of email
content to provide message integrity, where the hash value is stored on a known,
integrity-protected location. In its basic form, FriendlyMail secures email through
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IDA, IDB Unique user identifier for Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver) respectively.
Km Per-email, randomly generated symmetric key of adequate length (e.g.,
128 bits).
H(·) A cryptographically-secure hash function (e.g., SHA-256).
EKm(·) An authenticated, symmetric-key based encryption function (e.g., AES
in the CCM mode) with key Km.
Cm Content of an email message as compiled by Alice (email body only,
excluding email headers).
Cfm Content of an email message after being processed by FriendlyMail.
Chm Selected parameters from the email header (e.g., receiver’s address,
email subject).
Nm Per-email, randomly generated nonce.
x||y x concatenated with y.
Mrks,
Mrke
Marks the start and end of an encrypted email, respectively.
Ftr Footer appended by FriendlyMail; includes URL to FriendlyMail addon.
Table 2: Notation used in FriendlyMail
the use of an OSN and email service provider as two separate channels. To get the
original content of an encrypted email, the adversary should have access or intercept
both communication channels. For proper functioning of FriendlyMail, we need both
channels/services to be available. However, both parties (email and OSN providers)
are untrusted with the plaintext email content, and the content will remain secure
assuming these parties do not collaborate. Moreover, FriendlyMail is designed as
a client-side solution. Therefore, its adoption requires that email applications are
extendable (e.g., via browser plugin, or application addon). We would like to avoid
introducing a new client for usability/deployment reasons.
The main idea is to store keys and/or hash values of encrypted/integrity-protected
emails on the OSN accounts of FriendlyMail senders in email communications. Both
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keys and hash values are then made immediately available to the intended receivers.
The retrieved keys and hash values can later be used to decrypt encrypted emails and
verify their origin and content, or just to validate emails (their origin and content)
when just email integrity is desired. Figure 2 provides a brief overview of FriendlyMail.
For confidentiality and integrity purposes, FriendlyMail requires the OSN to
present the following characteristics:
(a) The OSN should form connections among users, e.g., friendship connections or
following, in which users can authenticate each other’s identity before getting
connected.
(b) The OSN should authenticate users and provide them with an integrity protected
channel, e.g., user’s wall in Facebook or direct, private message in Twitter. There-
fore, OSNs can be used as a second (secure) channel to provide automatic key
authenticity and integrity verification. This authentication is required to prevent
from unauthorized access or modification to user’s OSN account.
(c) The OSN should enable the sharing of a message between multiple users through
a proper access control mechanism, e.g., to maintain the confidentiality of keys
posted as a message or wall posts shared between intended users through private
messaging or privacy settings.
(d) The OSN should be highly available to provide FriendlyMail with free and scalable
servers for storing keys and hashes and should not limit users to have access to
their old data residing on the OSN servers.
(e) The OSN should be pervasive, so that it can serve vast majority of senders and
receivers of FriendlyMail secure emails.
Any existing OSNs with the above mentioned characteristics could be used as
the second channel, and thus, making the FriendlyMail design flexible for greater
adoption.
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4.2 Modes of Operation
FriendlyMail has two primary modes of operation: Encryption and Origin and con-
tent verification. The FriendlyMail primary modes assume a direct trust relationship
and are described in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2. In Section 5.4, we consider other trust re-
lationships, and also discuss several variants that may address some limitations of the
primary mode. Both modes of operations are done on user demand; see Section 4.3.
FriendlyMail requires explicit user selection for confidentiality-protected messages,
before beginning the composition of such a message. Unlike a non-confidential email
(e.g., integrity-protected only), this selection cannot be done through a checkbox;
see under “Protecting emails during compose and read” in Section 5.2. Therefore,
FriendlyMail adds an additional button inside the email client’s interface; see, e.g.,
Secret COMPOSE in Figure 1. FriendlyMail also notifies the user about system
status through several visual cues along with security statements.
Figure 1: Secret compose button
Consider a scenario in which Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver. Alice
installs FriendlyMail (in case of first time usage) and runs her email client. In the
following sections, we detail FriendlyMail and user steps for sending/receiving confi-
dential and integrity-protected emails; see Table 2 for notation used. We describe the
steps necessary for Alice to send a protected (confidential and/or integrity-protected)
email to Bob. Users are also assumed to be logged into their OSN account (for OSN
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related steps), otherwise they are asked to login by FriendlyMail. No registration or
additional setup is required by the user. Moreover, FriendlyMail does not require that
Bob has its plug-in already installed on his machine, so that Alice can send encrypted
emails to Bob using FriendlyMail.
Figure 2: Simplified FriendlyMail steps: (1) a per-message randomly generated key and
the calculated hash value of the encrypted email are shared with the recipient via an OSN
site; (2) the encrypted email message is sent via the regular email provider; (3) the recipient
receives the encrypted email; and (4) the email content is decrypted by the per-message
key retrieved from the OSN and the integrity of its content is verified by comparing the
retrieved hash value from the OSN and the locally calculated one.
4.2.1 Confidential Emails
Using the above mentioned scenario, FriendlyMail and users perform the following
steps in the encryption mode.
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Sending an encrypted email.
1. Alice initiates composing a confidential email by clicking on the added “Secret
COMPOSE” button in the main page. The familiar compose window is dis-
played with some visual cues (e.g., a green border), indicating that a secure
email is being composed.
2. Alice will be able to send an encrypted email to Bob, only if Bob is among
her OSN friends. FriendlyMail searches for IDB among Alice’s OSN friends’
list to check if they are friends; see Section 5.2 under “Local storage” for more
details on how FriendlyMail matches users’ email and OSN accounts. Otherwise,
Alice has no choice but to discard the email. FriendlyMail also notifies Alice
that Bob is not her friend on the OSN, thus no encrypted email can be sent
to Bob. During the message composition, FriendlyMail will block the email
client’s post/update events that are commonly used to auto-save email drafts.
Blocking these events is critical; otherwise, the plaintext content is exposed to
the email server. However, to support auto-save, local storage may be used.
3. When Alice indicates that she has finished the message composition (e.g., by
hitting the Secret Send button), FriendlyMail generates a nonce Nm and a
random symmetric key Km; both parameters are specific to the current email.
More details on key generation are discussed in Section 4.4 under “Automatic
key management”.
4. The plaintext email with the appended nonce, Nm , is then encrypted using
Km. Nm is used to make each email unique, even if the message content (Cm)
is the same for different emails. This also ensures uniqueness of the shared
hash value H(Cfm||Chm), which is used as an index during message retrieval on
the receiver’s side; see Section 4.4 under “Email integrity protection” for more
details on Nm.
5. After adding the markers and footer, the message body, Cfm, is set to
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Cfm = Mrks||EKm(Cm||Nm)||Mrke||Ftr
For more information about the footer, start and end markers see Section 5
under “FriendlyMail message format”. We do not encrypt the email subject line
(Subject), similar to PGP, see e.g., Symantec PGP Desktop.1 Users may decide
on opening an email based on its Subject, or later search their emails using
keywords from Subject. However, we would like to integrity-protect Subject
and few other header items; we use Chm = Subject||IDB.
6. FriendlyMail computes the hash value of the message body and selected header
parameters, H(Cfm||Chm);
7. The key Km and hash value H(Cfm||Chm) are securely published to Alice’s OSN
account to be instantly accessible only to Bob (e.g., as a post on her Facebook
wall or a tweet on her Twitter account); see step 1 in Figure 2.
8. The processed email content (Cfm with all header parameters) is sent to Bob
via the email service provider; see step 2 in Figure 2. The user-to-OSN/email
channels must be protected by other means (e.g., via SSL). The user-to-OSN
channels must be protected for obvious reasons (i.e., to protect key and hash
values). If user-to-email service channels are not encrypted, the OSN site may
break email confidentiality if it can collect the encrypted content.
Decrypting a received email.
1. Bob first receives the encrypted version of the email (i.e., Cfm); see step 3 in
Figure 2. If the FriendlyMail addon is not installed, Bob can choose to install
it from the link provided in the footer; see Figure 4.
2. FriendlyMail installed on Bob’s system detects the encrypted email by finding
the start and end markers, (Mrks and Mrke), and automatically attempts to
verify the email and retrieve the encryption key to decrypt the email content.
1http://www.symantec.com/docs/HOWTO41924
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To avoid privacy breaches in public places due to automatic decryption, the
addon can be configured to ask for confirmation from Bob before initiating the
decryption process; see Figure 10.
3. For verification, if Alice is identified as Bob’s friend, the addon computes the
hash H(Cfm||Chm) of the received email.
4. It then searches for the calculated H(Cfm||Chm) on Alice’s account. If a match-
ing hash value is found on Alice’s OSN account, the message is decrypted by
Km as posted along with the hash value (step 4 in Figure. 2). A matching hash
value verifies Alice’s identity and the integrity of the received email.
5. The verification result is communicated to the receiver through multiple visual
cues: Alice’s name and picture are fetched from her OSN profile and presented
inside the mail client’s interface, along with a link to Alice’s OSN profile. If a
matching hash is not found, the email’s origin and content cannot be verified,
and Bob is notified through the email client user interface.
Replying to an encrypted email.
When replying to an encrypted email from Alice, Bob must encrypt his message.
To be on the safe side, we assume that Alice prefers a confidential response to her
encrypted email. To avoid replying to an encrypted email, containing sensitive in-
formation, accidentally in the clear by Bob the same steps are then followed as for
composing and sending an encrypted email.
Forwarding an encrypted email.
FriendlyMail disables forwarding a decrypted email to other recipients. When
Bob attempts to forward such an email, the original portion sent by Alice remains
encrypted under Alice’s key used for encrypting the email (Km). Content inserted by
Bob into the forwarded email can be encrypted or not, depending on Bob’s preference.
However, Bob may share Alice’s key with other recipients or simply decrypt the
encrypted email and resend it in plaintext, or encrypt it using his own key. We
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exclude these scenarios and assume that Bob is non-malicious; see Section 3.
4.2.2 Integrity-protected Emails
Below we elaborate the FriendlyMail and user steps to make the alteration to the
origin and/or content of a sent email detectable to the receiver. When Alice believes
that she is not sending any confidential information to Bob, she may decide to inform
Bob about any alteration made to her email.
Sending an email with verifiable origin and content integrity.
1. Alice enables origin and content verification, e.g., through a checkbox; see Fig-
ure 6 and 7.
2. When Alice indicates that she has completed the message composition, as in
the encryption mode, FriendlyMail searches for Bob in Alice’s friend list on the
OSN. If Bob is found, it continues to the next step, otherwise it notifies Alice
through visual cues and security statements that Bob is not her friend on the
OSN and no integrity verifiable email can be sent to Bob. Therefore the email
should be discarded.
3. FriendlyMail grabs the message body, generates a nonce Nm, and sets the mes-
sage body to Cfm = Cm||Nm||Ftr. Note that, unlike for confidential messages,
we do not interfere with the auto-save option here. In this case, we are simply
interested to provide integrity protection for the email content.
4. For integrity protection of header parameters, we use Chm = Subject||IDB;
then the message hash is calculated as H(Cfm||Chm). Bob’s address is included
in the hash calculation to prevent replay attacks as discussed in Section 6.1,
item 5.
5. The hash value is shared on Alice’s retrieved OSN account (e.g., Facebook wall),
accessible only to Bob (e.g., in case of Facebook, through the use of privacy
settings).
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6. The email content (Cfm) remains unencrypted and is sent to Bob through reg-
ular email services.
7. FriendlyMail communicates to Alice about the success/failure of the operations
through visual cues integrated in the user interface and appropriate security
statements.
Verifying an email’s origin and content integrity.
1. When Bob opens Alice’s email, a footer indicates that it has been sent through
FriendlyMail, and allows Bob to install the FriendlyMail addon (if not already
installed).
2. FriendlyMail grabs the message body and calculates the hash of the body con-
tent and the selected headers, H(Cfm||Chm) .
3. It then searches Alice’s OSN account for: H(Cfm||Chm) (in case Alice is already
found as Bob’s friend on the OSN); if found, the message content is verified.
The message origin (i.e., Alice’s identity) is also verified as Alice is identified as
Bob’s OSN friend. If Alice is not found as Bob’s friend, FriendlyMail notifies
Bob that Alice is not his friend on the OSN, therefore the origin is not verified.
Finally if the matching hash cannot be found on Alice’s OSN account, the
content integrity of the email is not verified. The verification result is presented
to Bob through the email UI and through appropriate security statements.
Replying to/forwarding a regular or verifiable email.
A regular or FriendlyMail integrity-protected email can be replied or forwarded,
in either confidential or integrity-protected mode, based on the user’s preference.
4.3 Transparency and User Consent
There is a trade-off between security and usability. Users do not generally have an
accurate mental model of security concepts and threats. Educating users is not also
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very reliable and generally does not result in a desired level of security. [43]. Users
also may not be interested in fairly complex security configurations that are put in
place to prevent attackers. Moreover, users’ interaction with security systems often
degrades the security of the system and therefore, user intervention with security
related tasks should be avoided [14]. In order to maintain the expected security level
of a system, instead of relying on educating users, developers should design their
systems with minimal user involvements especially when it comes to make critical
security decisions [43, 14]. Therefore, in FriendlyMail we avoid unnecessary user
involvements by making most operations automatic by FriendlyMail.
On the other hand, user consent in performing critical actions like encrypting sen-
sitive emails should be taken into account. Email encryption by default might not
be always possible especially for client-based email. Compatibility issues of different
email encryption approaches as used by different users, prevent from having trans-
parent encryption for all emails. Encryption by default would require a universal
standard. Additionally, there is a trade-off between security and convenience in auto-
matic secure systems. Although automation prevents users from accidentally sending
sensitive content in the clear leading to sensitive information’s disclosure, sending all
the emails encrypted, may be annoying to the user. Encrypting all mundane emails
can impose usability burden on the receiver [39]. Moreover, providing users with
selective email protection, helps them to gradually accustom to, learn and be more
conscious of securing their emails. Therefore, we believe users should have the ability
to decide which email to encrypt.
Although security tasks should be performed as transparently as possible, still
users should be aware of the success or failure of their desired tasks [76, 39]. Friend-
lyMail notifies users about system states using visual aids along with security state-
ments. Displaying visual cues may not need direct attention of the user and can be
easily comprehended (see e.g., Gutmann [43]). Therefore, they are more effective,
faster and user-friendly than just security statements. Displaying information and
photo of the sender to the receiver may also make the comprehension of security
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statements easier [52, 50]. Moreover, displaying OSN personal information and photo
of the sender of an email, may be counted as an intuitive proof to the receiver that
the user identity is actually verified. We believe that the integration of senders’ OSN
personal information could be beneficial, specially in cases where weaker authenti-
cation is acceptable (e.g., indirect connections). We also believe that using different
colors to make secure composition windows stand out, helps users to be more vigi-
lant and avoid accidentally composing sensitive emails in unprotected windows; e.g.,
users gradually understand that if a green border does not show up in a composition
window, their email content would not be protected. Therefore, we employ different
border colors conveying the state of the system, and integrate the sender’s OSN in-
formation with email message viewer in the case of successful email encryption and
verification.
4.4 Integration with OSNs
The idea of leveraging OSNs stems from the fact that it eliminates the need of further
user authentication by FriendlyMail and it simplifies key management. Most email
privacy-enhanced tools, lack a simple and intuitive approach for user authentication
and key management; for example, there is still no user-friendly approach for binding
user identities and certificates in PGP and S/MIME. As discussed in Section 2.1.1,
PGP trust model is still rather complex. On the other hand, symmetric key ap-
proaches also require users to authenticate each other and share their key in a secure
manner. Symmetric key service-based approaches that automate key management
(e.g., [29]), are limited to the registered users and cannot easily serve a large popula-
tion of users. The scalability of such a service in terms of number of connections to
the server per encryption/decryption and key storage could also be challenging.
We believe our approach is more feasible as it does not introduce any deployment
complexity and future maintenance; OSNs bring the advantage of free, highly avail-
able and scalable servers for storing keys and/or hash values; see Section 6.2.1 item
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(3). Moreover we believe it has more acceptance among users, as OSNs are already
accepted and trusted by a large group of people. According to the global web analyt-
ics company, comScore [13, 12], OSNs are getting more widespread among Internet
users. Finally as our approach does not require any special characteristic of a specific
OSN, several existing OSNs may meet FriendlyMail design requirements and can be
used as a second (secure) channel.
User authentication. Generally two forms of authentication exist on OSNs. The
first authentication is done between the OSN service provider and the user. The
OSN service provider checks if the registering user is “human” and not using multiple
persona. OSNs also enforce access control mechanisms on the user’s account to protect
its integrity.
The second authentication is performed in the circle of friends on OSNs. A user re-
ceiving a friend request, may verify the identity of the requester by checking available
information on his/her OSN account, e.g., profile information, email address, com-
mon friends, then confirms his/her identity upon accepting the friendship request.
Moreover, there is more chance that users, establishing a friendship connection, have
a pre-knowledge about each other or some history together that can help identity ver-
ification. This identity verification can also be continuously checked after accepting
the friendship request, based on further visible personal information and user activity
on the OSN over time.
Additionally, as trust in the OSNs is transitive, the circle of trust and authenti-
cated connections can be extended to the friend-of-friends in a lower trust level. A
user may recommend one or more of his/her friends to other friends. Also, receiving
a friend request from a person with common friends, is more likely to be accepted
due to the trust in friends’ judgements.
Based on the above discussion, we define three authentication levels in OSNs. The
strongest authentication level is defined among OSNs friends. A weaker authentica-
tion exists among friends-of-friends. While the weakest one is among all OSNs users
with no direct connection at all.
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Automatic key management. Secure exchange of secret keys, has always been
a deployment barrier for symmetric encryption schemes. Usability issues associated
with key distribution in such schemes also force the use of long-term keys. Long-term
keys raise a security concern; if the shared secret key is compromised, the original
content of all the previously encrypted emails would be revealed.
To address the above mentioned issues, our approach instead, generates a 128-bit
random key per message; then automatically distributes the key through an OSN
to make it instantly available to the specified receiver. Thus, we avoid the use of
long-term keys while taking away the burden of exchanging secret keys from users.
Therefore, if a key shared on the OSN is compromised, it only discloses the original
content of its corresponding encrypted email while other emails would still remain
confidential.
However, in the case where both the OSN and email accounts are compromised,
the original content of all previously encrypted emails are exposed to the attackers.
One way to mitigate this risk is to delete the keys from the OSN as soon as the
sender makes sure the receiver has retrieved the key or after a certain period of time.
However, such deletion cannot always guarantee that the key and its corresponding
encrypted email are safe, as the adversary can always attack before the key is deleted
from the OSN. Also, it may take a long time for keys to be completely deleted from
OSNs’ servers; see Section 3.3 item 2.
Email integrity protection. There are times that users may not need message
confidentiality. For the purpose of gradual adoption and flexibility, our approach
provides users with selective capabilities: encryption, message authentication and
content integrity verification. We use SHA-256 as a hash function to provide mes-
sage modification and detection. Alternatively, Message Authentication Code (MAC)
could also provide integrity and authenticity for emails using a shared secret key. We
do not need MAC, since benefiting from the OSNs, we already have a second (secure)
channel (the user’s OSN account) to distribute the hash values of emails. Moreover,
unlike MAC which is sent along with the email content and thus is visible to users,
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the process of origin and content integrity verification of our approach is completely
transparent to users.
We believe when senders and receivers have no prior contact or direct connection
as friends in the OSNs, integrity of their email content is more important than their
confidentiality. While hash values can be published through other means, such as a
corporate website, FriendlyMail offers some advantages. If the sender publishes the
hash values of her emails on a personal/corporate website, the receiver must know
the URL beforehand, must trust the website’s integrity and the verification process
may require careful user-involvement (cf. [84]). In contrast, FriendlyMail automates
the verification process, and relies on the existing trust relationship (albeit weak) as
established through the Like feature.
To have unique hashes for emails with similar content, a random nonce is added
to the content of each email before computing the hash. There are several reasons
to have unique hash values. First, if the same email is sent multiple times by the
same user, each of them should be verified individually. As we only search among
hashes, published during a certain period of time; and OSNs may remove redundant
similar posts on the users’ wall, similar hash values would not be made visible on
the wall and the process of verification may fail. Moreover, as these hash values are
also used as the index of encrypted emails to retrieve their corresponding decryption
keys, unique hashes (unique indices) are necessary to locate the corresponding key
(in cases where customized keys are used and the same key is used for encrypting
similar emails). Finally, in the case when hash values are publicly available, nonce
can be used as a counter measure to an attack, in which the attacker can compute the
hash of several messages and compare them to the one posted on the sender’s wall.
If a matching hash is found, the attacker could get the content of the communicated
emails. In order to prevent this attack, the length of the nonce should be of adequate




To validate the viability of our design, we implement a prototype, called Friendly-
Mail. Transparent user authentication, key management, encryption/decryption and
integrity verification are handled at the client side. It also provides a seamless integra-
tion with the email user interface to preserve the existing user experience. However,
due to the absence of a secure email standard, an inevitable challenge to client side
approaches is to implement the approach for each particular email client. In the fol-
lowing sections we first elaborate our certain implementation choices and challenges.
We then discuss our implementation in detail; and finally we outline some variants
to FriendlyMail.
5.1 Implementation Choices and Challenges
To satisfy our design and implementation goals and requirements, we choose our im-
plementation components accordingly. Since a significant part of the implementation
requires changes to the email client user interface and HTML manipulation, Friend-
lyMail is implemented as a browser extension. Installation of browser extensions is
fairly easy. Moreover, a browser addon works on top of any operating system, pro-
viding availability and portability to a significant portion of nowadays email users.
Although FriendlyMail has been currently implemented for webmails, our design can
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be implemented on regular email clients as well (e.g., desktop and mobile clients).
To benefit a large number of email users, the prototype is built for the web-based
Gmail application [44], using Facebook as the OSN service [44]. For OSN support,
we use Facebook APIs, which are relatively stable and easy to use, but sometimes
limited in terms of features that would have simplified our implementation; see Sec-
tion 5.3. Our implementation for the desktop environment includes a Firefox addon
and a Facebook app. Our implementation is not restricted to a specific browser and
porting FriendlyMail to other browsers should be straight-forward.
The prototype highlights challenges of implementing a rather simple design on top
of existing email/OSN services. These challenges also show why real-world implemen-
tation is non-trivial, compared to a stand-alone, proof-of-concept implementation. A
stand-alone prototype with a specific email client and a custom OSN (e.g., managed
by a service run by us) could have reduced our efforts. However, we believe that
there is little to no chance of such proof-of- concept implementations being used in
practice. Our implementation is complicated by the intricacies of Gmail’s client-side
implementation, which was subject to few substantial changes during our development
and testing over the last 12 months. One major change was due to the introduction
of a new user interface for composing an email which forced us to add support for the
new UI. No official working JavaScript Gmail API is available, specially for modify-
ing the Gmail user interface. A few years ago Google team provided a Greasemonkey
script for Gmail called Gmail-greasemonkey [67], which is currently broken due to
the major changes made to Gmail UI and is no longer maintained. There are few
other unofficial or user created APIs, which are complex or fragile, due to their de-
pendency on the Gmail client application. Therefore, we prefer to implement Gmail
UI and related functionality, rather than relying on unofficial APIs which may not be
maintained on time or at all.
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5.2 Firefox Addon
FriendlyMail is developed as an extension to Firefox browser in JavaScript and XUL
(XML User Interface Language) [58]. Its main task is to modify the Gmail user inter-
face, providing the interaction between the user and FriendlyMail. It employs Firefox
XPCOM (Cross-platform Component Object Model) interfaces [57] to perform some
browser related functionality provided by Firefox browser. For cryptographic sup-
port (e.g., encryption, hash calculation, random key generation), we use the Stanford
JavaScript Crypto Library (SJCL [81]). Crypto support through JavaScript APIs is
still a work-in-progress; see the current working draft of W3C web crypto API at:
www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/. For authenticated encryption, we use AES-128
in the CCM mode [19], and for hash calculation, we use SHA-256. In addition to
integrity verification purposes, these hash values are used as index of keys/hashes
stored on Facebook. To convert the binary output of encryption, we use the Base64
encoding function. The output from SHA-256 is also formatted into hex before being
posted to OSN accounts.
As discussed in Chapter 4, FriendlyMail provides users with two main security
features: a) Users may decide to protect their sensitive email content while ensuring
the receiver about the originality of the email. b) The content of the email is not of
great importance or sensitive, hence only enabling integrity verification would suffice.
In the following, we discuss the FriendlyMail message format and changes we made
to the Gmail UI. Later we explain the details of implementation of the two mentioned
security modes, followed with the challenges we faced during the course of deployment.
FriendlyMail message format. Our prototype currently supports emails
containing both plaintext and HTML. To make a secure FriendlyMail email
(confidential/integrity-protected) distinguishable from other emails, a footer is ap-
pended to all emails processed by FriendlyMail. It also makes the receiver aware of
the use of FriendlyMail and provides a download link to the FriendlyMail addon. We
embed the download link into every FriendlyMail email, in case when the receiver
41
receives a secure email from a FriendlyMail user for the first time, or the receiver
was already a FriendlyMail user but at some point has removed FriendlyMail. In
addition to the footer, the start and end markers are appended to the beginning
and the end of the ciphertext of an encrypted email and allow the addon to detect
encrypted content, and process it accordingly. Figure 9 illustrates the confidential
and integrity-protected email format respectively. Figure 4 is the screenshot of a
confidential email.
Starting marker Encrypted email Ending marker Footer
(a) Confidential email
Verifiable email content Footer
(b) Integrity-protected email
Figure 3: FriendlyMail message format
Figure 4: FriendlyMail confidential email and footer
Consistent user interface. To make FriendlyMail’s use simple and effective, we
focus on keeping the Gmail UI close to the default interface. We integrate Friendly-
Mail’s functionality into the existing Gmail interface and keep visual modifications
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to a minimum. Our few changes to the Gmail UI include adding a few buttons and
a check box, e.g., the only addition to the main page of the Gmail’s UI is a Secret
Compose button; see Figure 1.
(a) Sender side changes. To make the process of sending an encrypted email
automatic, we modify the Gmail UI, by adding our specific Secret send but-
ton (replaced with the original Gmail Send button). As visual aids, we change
the color of the added button, the border around the composition area of the
composition window to green. We also change the label of the added button to
Secret send. These changes are intuitive security indicators, by which users can
figure out that the current composition window and button are specialized for
composing and sending sensitive emails; see Figure 5.
Figure 5: Composing an encrypted email
When the user finishes writing her email and clicks on the Secret send button to
send her email, our prototype immediately grabs the email content, and performs
all the steps discussed in Section 4.2.1 to secure the email content in encryption
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mode. It then simulates a click on the Gmail original Send button to trigger the
attached event listener, so that the encrypted email could be automatically sent
through Gmail as normal emails. Directly calling Gmail functions, called from the
event listener attached to the original send button, or implementing the SMTP
protocol to send the encrypted data directly to Gmail servers, are alternatives to
the click simulation on the Send button.
To enable integrity verification for an email, the user can tick a checkbox, added
right next to the Gmail Send button in the composition window; see Figure 6.
The checkbox is placed close to the send button to be noticeable by the user. To
take user consent into consideration, we disable the checkbox by default, as it is
the regular work flow of email. Therefore, the user decides when to enable the
integrity-protection mode. When the user enables the checkbox, similar to the
encryption mode, we change the color of the composition area to green to notify
users that integrity verification mode is enabled; see Figure 7. We attach an event
listener to the Gmail send button. The event listener is triggered upon clicking
the send button by the user. If the integrity mode is enabled, FriendlyMail grabs
the email content and carry on all the steps discussed in Section 4.2.2.
(b) Receiver side changes. As the user opens and views an email, FriendlyMail
checks for encrypted/integrity-protected email by FriendlyMail. If an encrypted
email is detected, the sender’s identity is verified and the email content is de-
crypted automatically according to the steps presented in Section 4.2.1. However,
if the user enables the option of do not automatically decrypt, a security state-
ment in a green border and background along with a decryption button would
be shown outside of the message body. The security statement indicates that the
email content is encrypted and the user can see the original content by clicking on
the decryption button; see Figure 10. If an integrity-protected email is detected,
FriendlyMail automatically grabs the content and verifies the sender’s identity
and integrity of the content.
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Figure 6: Before enabling email verification
Figure 7: After enabling email verification
(c) Visual cues and notifications. To notify users about the successful completion
or failure of an operation, we integrate several visual cues and security statements
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into the Gmail UI. For example, FriendlyMail notifies senders whether or not their
email can be protected (in terms of confidentiality and/or origin and content
verification). The receiver is also notified if the encrypted email can be decrypted
and/or the integrity of email can be verified. We use green color border and
background for security statements in case of success and red color border and
background in case of failure. Yellow color is used in situations where the current
task requires user attention or action; see Figure 9a. As discussed in Section 4.3,
after verifying the identity of the sender, we integrate the sender’s OSN name,
photo and a link to his OSN profile into the Gmail UI; see Figure 9b.
Modifications to the UI, e.g., adding buttons, visual cues and notifications, are
also carefully performed to prevent any user confusion or possible attacks (see
Chapter 6.1). In the course of development, we designed and implemented sev-
eral UIs and performed several laboratory user tests among our research group.
We consistently changed the UI, according to our tests’ results to achieve more
effective and usable UI.
Figure 8: Disabled composition UI
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(a) The modified Gmail UI message composition window with notifications and visual cues
(b) The modified Gmail UI message viewer with all integrated receiver’s OSN account
information and other visual cues.
Figure 9: Notifications and visual cues
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Figure 10: Decryption confirmation
Protecting emails during compose and read. The webmail interface is con-
trolled by webmail providers. Email providers in general scan, index and save user
emails during composition and opening/reading, for reasons including: automatic
save, targeted advertising, spam filtering, virus detection, spell checking and search
indexing. These operations are performed on the server and/or client ends. Email
encryption prevents email providers from having control over email content to some
extent; by encrypting emails, email providers can no longer scan email content on the
server side. Emails residing on backup servers are also encrypted.
In Gmail’s case, emails can be scanned on the client side when a user opens an
email (targeted ad) and during composition (saving drafts and spell checks). We
display the content of a received FriendlyMail-protected email inside a specialized
HTML element, seamlessly overlaid on top of Gmail’s email content display area.
Thus, decrypted emails are displayed within the locally-trusted browser environment,
inaccessible to the Gmail UI. Email content is protected during the composition of
a confidential email as follows. We register an observer for HTTP requests (http-
on-modify-request notification) using XPCOM’s nsIObserverService [59] to intercept
HTTP requests and discard requests regarding, e.g., auto saving, that post email
content to Gmail servers. This allows the user to benefit from Gmail’s rich text editor
and formatting options, without leaking any content. FriendlyMail notifies users when
drafts are discarded; see Figure 5 at the bottom of the composition window next to the
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composition toolbar (save failed). However, this approach has two limitations that
may adversely affect usability of email systems to some extent. First, users cannot
switch between protected and unprotected modes during composition, as otherwise
protected content may become accessible to Gmail in the unprotected mode. Thus,
users must decide before composition if an email will be confidential or not. Second,
some useful features as offered by Gmail become unavailable, e.g., automatic draft
savings and spell checks. Note that, the built-in Firefox spell checker still remains
accessible.
Integrity checks for HTML emails. Before rendering an HTML email, webmail
clients may parse the HTML code through several filters, strip attributes and white
spaces, and add new HTML elements. For example, Gmail only supports inline
CSS, strips ID and CLASS attributes, and eliminates other attributes for security
reasons. Some attribute might also be added by Gmail . Thus, the HTML email being
displayed at the receiver side may be slightly different from the original one, and may
result in different hash values. To overcome this issue, we strip HTML tags, attributes
and white spaces which are not shown at both sides from both the sender/receiver
ends before computing the hash. We strip elements that do not interfere with the
integrity of the email but are mainly used for rendering HTML, leaving the original
content intact. For example, we did not strip href attribute, containing the URL of a
link included in an email. The integrity of this URL is important, especially because
the URL itself may not be shown to the user and be used to mount phishing attacks.
Alternatively, the unmodified content could be fetched from Gmail’s Show original
link.
Local storage. Binding an email address to the corresponding Facebook account is
not always straightforward, even when the same email address is used as the Facebook
user ID or has been added to the user’s account. Facebook currently does not allow
applications search user’s friends by their email addresses. Facebook applications,
that request users’ email address permission by the current user access token, can
only get the email address of the current user, who is currently logged into Facebook.
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However, searching among the current user’s friends by their email address, is not
allowed.
We gradually build a mapping between email and OSN IDs, and store this mapping
locally in a SQLite database under browser’s profile folder of the user who is currently
using FriendlyMail. For a given email address, this local storage is first searched for
the corresponding OSN ID. For the first protected email from Alice to Bob, Bob’s
OSN ID will not be found in the local storage. The addon will query Alice’s Facebook
friends’ list for Bob, using Bob’s name (as found in the email client). If multiple names
are found, Alice is shown the profiles of all matching users, and asked to select the
intended recipient. When no matching names are found, Alice’s entire friends’ list is
displayed. Alice is also asked for confirming Bob’s profile, even when a single match
is found; see Figure 11. This local storage also improve the usability of our system, as
prompting users to choose the corresponding OSN account, each time they want to
send/read a FriendlyMail email, degrades the usability of our system. After Alice’s
selection, Bob’s email address and OSN ID are locally stored and used for future
FriendlyMail exchanges. We do not require that each user uses its own browser
profile so FriendlyMail can also be used on a shared or public system. Users’ email
address and Facebook ID are not considered to be sensitive, and the local storage can
be deleted after removing FriendlyMail addon from browser. Moreover, in the case
that an email address and Facebook ID, found on the database, do not belong to a
friend of the current user, FriendlyMail could detect by searching the Facebook id
among the current user’s OSN friend. However, the addon verifies if a locally stored
Facebook ID is currently a friend of the sender, before publishing keys/hashes.
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Figure 11: Selection/confirmation of friends’ Facebook profile
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5.3 Facebook Application
To interact with Facebook and perform Facebook related functionality on behalf of
the user, our Firefox addon uses our registered Facebook application (to leverage
Facebook API, an app ID is required). We use Facebook login API [27] to authenti-
cate the sending/receiving FriendlyMail users and get their access token (to retrieve
some non-public user information a valid user access token is required). We use the
client side version of the login API, in which FriendlyMail requests a login dialog
from Facebook to be displayed to the user. The familiar login page assures users that
they are providing credentials directly to Facebook; see Figure 12. The login request
contains parameters such as FriendlyMail client id and a redirect URI where the ac-
cess token will be returned to. Another parameter is scope, in which all permissions
required by the application should be listed. The app requests the following per-
missions: read stream, user likes and publish stream. During the app’s installation,
we inform the user about these permissions, and the data that FriendlyMail will be
accessing from the user’s Facebook profile; see also Section 6.1, item 12.
Figure 12: Login page
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When the FriendlyMail addon is launched for the first time, the Facebook app
is also installed (with user permission) and the user is prompted to grant the above
mentioned permissions. An access token is received as a part of the redirect-URI in
the Facebook response after a successful login. The token provides secure access to
Facebook APIs (albeit time-limited). As client side’s user access tokens are short-
lived, FriendlyMail prompts users to login whenever the access token is expired. The
token is used to, e.g., to publish/fetch keys and hash values. Most API calls regarding
searching e.g., among friends or hashes/keys are done through Facebook Query Lan-
guage (FQL)[21], and publishing hashes/keys as feeds to the user’s Facebook wall is
done through Graph API[24]. All connections between the user client (FriendlyMail
Firefox extension) and Facebook servers are also secured using SSL.
Optimization of searching the keys/hashes of the emails. To search
keys/hashes of FriendlyMail emails through Facebook API, the FriendlyMail addon
finds the sender’s Facebook account, and searches for the computed hash using the
Facebook query language (FQL) API. FQL calls are quite fast, but as more hashes
are added to a user’s profile, the search time may be noticeable. As an optimization,
we currently limit the API query to a specific time interval (e.g., 24 hours), based
on when an email is received; the FriendlyMail will retrieve the date and time that
a FriendlyMail email is delivered to the receiver and converts it to the UNIX time.
It then searches among hashes/keys posted on the sender’s wall after the calculated
UNIX time. This optimization also restricts replays of old emails from a compromised
email account; see Section 6.1, item 7.
5.4 Variants to FriendlyMail
We outline several variants below. We have also implemented variants (a) and (b) as
customizable options; see Figure 13.
(a) Custom keys. One obvious risk for our key transport via OSN sites is that
the email and OSN providers may collude to decrypt a confidential email (see
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Figure 13: FriendlyMail options
Section 6.1, item 1). As a mitigation, advanced users can generate their own
encryption keys and share them via a secure channel, such as in-person meeting
or over the phone.
(b) Integrity and origin checks through OSN organizational pages. Exist-
ing impersonal relationships can also be leveraged to provide message and origin
authentication. For example, many real-world and Internet-based organizations
currently maintain an OSN presence, e.g., via Facebook Pages.1 Example orga-
nizations include: TD Bank, Harvard University, USENIX Association. Many
users are connected to these pages through the “Like” relationship. Currently,
these organizations cannot send emails with integrity or origin authentication;
1https://www.facebook.com/about/pages
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in contrast, spam and phishing emails are often sent by impersonating such or-
ganizations. An integrity-protected email can be sent as follows: the email is
sent as usual, and the hash value is posted on the organization’s Facebook Page
(publicly accessible). Assuming the recipient has already “Liked” the Page, the
email is verified as follows: FriendlyMail checks the hash value of the received
email on the organization’s Page. The verification result and the corresponding
page are displayed to the recipient. The organization’s Page ID is included in the
email (as an additional footer), so that receivers can easily locate the Page; see
Figure 14. However, the Like relationship is still checked for verification. Note
that, as Facebook pages are public and visible even without having any OSN ac-
count, unlike the user profile, Facebook pages can be searched using their email
address or their website associated with the page through the API. Therefore, to
find a page, if the sender’s email address has been added as the Facebook page’s
admin, it can be directly searched by the email address, eliminating the need for
including its ID in the email content.
Figure 14: Page footer
(c) Message confidentiality and integrity through indirect OSN relation-
ships. If two users are connected by mutual friends (e.g., Facebook friends-of-
friends), FriendlyMail can provide confidentiality and integrity protections. The
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sender can post key/hash values visible only to the receiver. However, this would
require that the sender can access her friends’ friend lists. The current Facebook
Graph API disallows access to friends-of-friends lists by Facebook apps (but can
be implemented by JavaScript addons). Direct authentication is not achieved for
these indirect trust relationships, as both the sender and receiver must rely on
their mutual friend’s verification.
(d) Integrity checks for unconnected users. If Alice and Bob have no OSN
relationships, they can still achieve content integrity protection, but no identity
verification. Alice can publicly post the hash of an email, and Bob (or anyone
with access to the email content) can verify the content. Alice should include
her OSN ID in the email content, so that Bob can easily locate her profile and
check the hash value. FriendlyMail notifies both Alice and Bob that only content
verification is provided. Bob is also asked to manually verify Alice’s identity by
reviewing her OSN profile.
(e) Sharing keys through other channels. OSN provides an easy way for sharing
per-email keys; however, other channels can be used instead. If a user’s contact
list with phone numbers is available to a FriendlyMail addon (e.g., when used
from a smartphone), the keys can be sent via SMSes to the recipient. Contact
lists from instant messaging applications may also be used for key transport. The
FriendlyMail addon must be able to automate the key extraction from these sec-
ondary channels; i.e., users cannot be expected to manually input key materials.
(f) Group emails. A group email address can comprise an unlimited number of
email users. Group emails may be supported for integrity and origin authenti-
cation, if the email group is also represented as an OSN entity (e.g., Facebook
Groups). Each group member is connected to the OSN group whose posts are
only made available to its members and are not pushed to any user’s OSN page;
e.g., Facebook Groups with the “Secret” privacy option.2
2https://www.facebook.com/help/220336891328465
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(g) Multiple recipients. For confidentiality protection, all recipients must be
directly connected to the sender. The OSN provider must support private message
posts to a custom set of users. For integrity-only protection, when all recipients




In this chapter, we discuss several attacks on FriendlyMail and provide an analytical
usability and deployment analysis of FriendlyMail.
6.1 Threat Analysis
We consider different attacks on the FriendlyMail proposal under the threat model
outlined in Chapter 3.
1. Collusion attacks. Our assumption of non-colluding email and OSN
providers may be difficult to satisfy in practice. Beyond usual information shar-
ing between businesses, and company acquisitions, the email and OSN providers’
data may be subpoenaed if they are under the same legal jurisdiction (as is the
case for Google and Facebook). Note that, the recent incident [5] leaked the
fact that the PRISM program used by the National Security Agency (NSA),
gets users’ private online communications and data, through nine prominent
Internet companies, e.g., Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, Google, Apple, etc.
FriendlyMail can of course be extended to support multiple channels for sharing
a per-email key or the encrypted email (by dividing them into pieces; cf. [10]).
For example, Km may be divided into two parts (e.g., Km = K1 ⊕ K2), each
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part being shared with the recipient through independent channels; e.g., K1 via
Facebook and K2 via VK.
1 However, we believe that such a design can only be
useful for a small fraction of users due to usability/maintainability issues (e.g.,
requiring two OSN accounts with two different services).
Another apparent defence against colluding parties is to share a password be-
tween two users, and then post the per-email key to OSN after being encrypted
by the password. The OSN provider may try to launch a dictionary attack on
the encrypted key, assuming the password is relatively weak. To verify a key,
the OSN service would require access to the encrypted email. Thus, colluding
parties can still compromise encrypted emails, unless the shared password is
strong (e.g., with more than 80 bits of entropy).
2. Information leakage. With FriendlyMail, the OSN service receives hash/key
values for every protected email, including identities of the communicating par-
ties. The OSN provider also learns every time a protected email is accessed
(unless the retrieved key/hash values are stored locally). Although the email
content remains protected, the OSN provider now has access to the communi-
cation patterns of protected emails between two users. To restrict such leakage,
the sender’s addon may post bogus key/hash values; on the receiver side, the
addon may retrieve multiple key/hash values, and then use/ignore these values
as appropriate.
3. Email as account recovery. Usually, OSN providers rely on the user’s email
account for password recovery. Thus, if a user’s email account is compromised,
it is trivial to also compromise the OSN account. Therefore, we recommend
that FriendlyMail users be careful with their email accounts (e.g., logging in
only from user-owned devices), and use alternative password recovery options
(e.g., via SMS).
4. OSN notifications. OSN providers might send email notifications for events
1A Russian language OSN: vk.com.
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such as a new post, e.g., Facebook notifications [23]. Notifications for Friend-
lyMail messages must be disabled; otherwise, keys and hashes are sent to the
user’s email address, allowing the email provider access to confidential content.
5. Impersonation attacks. Assume that the hash of an integrity-protected
email is publicly posted (e.g., for unconnected users). If an attacker can in-
tercept the email, he can resend it to a different recipient, impersonating the
real sender. To detect this attack, the receiver’s address is also hashed, so that
the replayed email has a different hash value. As a result, the FriendlyMail ad-
don on the receiver’s side will fail to find a corresponding hash on the original
sender’s OSN account. The receiver is then notified about the hash mismatch.
6. Impersonation to a friend on OSNs. The adversary is familiar with
FriendlyMail design or is a FriendlyMail user. She intends to abuse FriendlyMail
to send malicious emails which look protected and trusted to the targeted user.
To do so, she needs to be friend with the receiver on the OSN. Therefore she
creates a fake account in the OSN impersonating a friend of the targeted user
and tricks the targeted user to accept her friend request. As FriendlyMail
relies on existing authenticated connections on the OSN, attack regarding fake
accounts cannot be detected.
7. Compromised email accounts. If a sender’s email account is compromised,
but not the OSN account, several attacks can be considered (besides item 3). An
attacker will be unable to decrypt encrypted messages without access to the vic-
tim’s OSN account; note that, we do not consider brute-forcing a random AES
128-bit key. The attacker also cannot send any new protected emails from the
compromised account (requires the OSN account access). However, as hashes
of previously sent protected emails are available on the sender’s OSN account,
the attacker could try to resend an old email to the original recipient. Note
that, sending such an email to new recipients will not be verified as discussed in
item 5. The attacker can also resend a captured FriendlyMail-processed email
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without even compromising the sender’s email account; the email can be sent
from any account by changing the FROM field to the intended sender’s address.
As the corresponding hash value would already be available on the victim’s OSN
account, on the receiver’s side, FriendlyMail would identify the replayed email
as authentic.
This attack could be mitigated by calculating the difference between the time
when the email was sent/received, and the time when the corresponding hash
value was published. If the difference is above a certain threshold, the receiver
is notified. Another detection mechanism would be to verify whether the order
in which emails are received corresponds to the order in which the hashes are
published.
8. Exposure of key and hash values. For obvious reason, the per-email key
Km must be made available only to the receiver. Any other relaxed restriction
on Km may break confidentiality. For example, if the key is published as visible
only to the sender’s friends’ list, any of those friends can access the email content
if they have access to the encrypted email. Similarly, for the integrity-only
protection, the hash values should preferably be available only to the recipient.
Otherwise, the communication patterns of a sender would be exposed, e.g., to
OSN friends/non-friends; see also item 2. Note that, only the OSN provider
may learn who the recipients are of a protected email, but the sender’s OSN
friends/non-friends cannot know the receivers’ identities.
9. Compromised OSN accounts. An attacker who has compromised the vic-
tim’s (Alice) OSN account has access to all stored key and hash values. The
attacker can also monitor the OSN account for new keys as they are posted. If
he has access to encrypted emails, the attacker can now read confidential emails.
He can also launch impersonation attacks as follows. The attacker creates an
email for Bob, impersonating Alice (i.e., FROM = IDA), and publishes the
hash on Alice’s OSN account (encryption keys can also be posted accordingly).
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When Bob checks the email for integrity and origin authentication, the verifica-
tion process succeeds (Bob is also able to decrypt an encrypted message). The
attacker can also delete all stored hash values and keys. This will not affect the
decryption and validation of past emails, if local copies of all keys and hashes
are kept.
10. Malicious email content. An attacker can send malicious URLs (including
links to adulterated FriendlyMail addons), and attachments within a protected
email. We do not address such attacks, as they are similar to existing phishing
emails. Only confidentiality and integrity of the content (malicious or benign),
and sender-authentication can be expected from FriendlyMail.
11. Visual cues and security statements. All security indicators are placed
outside of the email content area, to prevent the forgery of FriendlyMail indi-
cators within the content of a malicious email. The attacker can simply forge a
FriendlyMail protected email, add a FriendlyMail security statement conveying
a successfully decrypted/verified email in the beginning of the email. She then
sends it to another FriendlyMail user, tricking the user that it is a legitimate
and verified FriendlyMail email. As the user expects FriendlyMail to be secure
by default and everything is automatically controlled by FriendlyMail, if secu-
rity of FriendlyMail depends on the user’s attention, FriendlyMail might fail.
Also in the case that an email cannot be protected by FriendlyMail (e.g., the
receiver cannot be found among the sender’s OSN friends), FriendlyMail dis-
ables the composition UI, removes the send button to avoid any sensitive email
content to be accidentally sent by the user. It also notifies users through a red
border color and a security statement; see Figure 8.
12. No trusted third-parties. We introduce no third parties in our design; users
are also not required to trust the FriendlyMail developers. Both the Friendly-
Mail Firefox addon and Facebook app are open-source. We do not run any
service for users, or collect any information from users. Such a design choice
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may help user-acceptance, as a user’s email and OSN accounts could be ex-
tremely privacy-sensitive. Even though a trusted third party could simplify the
design and increase ease-of-use, we strongly discourage such practices, especially
from a privacy-enhancing tool.2
6.2 Usability and Deployment
Below we discuss FriendlyMail deployment and usability issues with email and OSN
providers. We have tested the current implementation within our research group,
mainly to check functionality and UI issues. The addon worked as expected. However,
no formal user studies have been performed yet.
6.2.1 Deployment Analysis
1. Email providers lose access to confidential messages, and thus, cannot directly
benefit from content-aware advertising. However, generic ads can still be served.
As only selected messages will be confidentiality-protected, revenues for ad-
supported email services are unlikely to suffer.
2. OSN providers may observe only minor changes to the number of posted mes-
sages, even if FriendlyMail is largely adopted. Each protected email will result
in additional content posted to OSNs; however, the size of each post is relatively
small (e.g., tens of bytes). Although the global email volume per day is large,
FriendlyMail may be used only for a small fraction of selected messages.
3. OSN providers will also receive more search queries due to FriendlyMail searches
for friends (and other supported relationships) and post messages. Queries are
2Cf. a statement from the popular Enlocked email security service (https://www.enlocked.com/
Works.html): “...the only one able to read your secured messages is you!...The systems at Enlocked
only have access to your messages for the short time we are encrypting or decrypting them, and
then our software instantly removes any copies.”
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issued when sending and opening each protected email. Server-side costs for
these queries would be non-trivial; the average number of friends is expected
to be moderate (e.g., 190 in Facebook as of Nov. 21, 2011 [4]); however, the
number of posted messages from FriendlyMail and regular OSN usage would
likely grow over time (hundreds or thousands, unless old posts are gradually
deleted). Note that modern OSN providers are apparently well-equipped to
handle such loads, as evident from their support for thousands of OSN-specific
apps that make extensive use of such queries.
6.2.2 Usability Analysis
1. Assume that a sender, Alice, is already logged into her OSN account; she also
identified Bob’s OSN profile (the receiver) to the FriendlyMail addon, when she
first sent a protected email to Bob. Subsequently, Alice only needs to select
Secret Compose for confidential emails, and tick a checkbox for integrity-only
protection. Bob can open an email as usual; sender authentication, message
verification, and decryption are performed automatically. However, to benefit
from FriendlyMail protections, Bob must check the UI notification messages as
provided by the addon.
2. Users must explicitly select integrity/confidentiality protections for their mes-
sages. This allows users to control how their messages are protected. However,
users may mistakenly send out sensitive information unprotected. This risk is
unavoidable as long as we cannot encrypt all emails by default, which may break
email communications in many scenarios (e.g., emails sent to OSN-unconnected
receivers).
3. Searching for email content is a useful feature for many users, and could be
even more efficient than organizing emails through complex rules (see e.g., [86]).
However, keyword search within server-stored encrypted emails is not supported
for now (but cf. [79]). Searches on locally-stored decrypted emails can be easily
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supported (e.g., by saving the decrypted versions, or the keys).
4. One challenge in our design could be the hash verification race issue, where
there is a delay in the stored hash on the OSN to be available to the receiver.
However, this should not be a concern now, as OSNs (e.g., Facebook) are very
fast. In the presence of such a delay, the receiver may open the received email
and try to verify or decrypt it, while the stored hash is not still available on
the sender’s OSN account. Therefore, the locally computed hash value does not
match any hashes on the sender’s OSN account and the email cannot be verified
or the decryption key cannot be found. To address this issue, one solution could
be to check the presence of the stored hash on the sender’s OSN account by
FriendlyMail, before sending the email to the receiver. As another solution, if
FriendlyMail at the sender side could not find the exact matching hash value
in the first attempt, it should ask the receiver to check the email again later to
make sure if it is not a false alarm due to the latency. However, both solutions
adversely affect usability of FriendlyMail to some extent; in the first solution,
the sender should wait until the hash is available, then the email can be sent.
In the second solution, the receiver needs to check the received email several
times.
5. Message posts from FriendlyMail on the OSN site may clutter the sender’s
message page. However, as is the case for Facebook, the OSN site may support
hiding messages from selected apps/users. One limitation of Facebook API is
also that Facebook apps cannot automatically publish hidden posts to users’
wall. However if users hide them, Facebook apps can search among hidden
posts.
6. We depend on the OSN’s availability to be able to provide email Confiden-
tiality and email integrity. When the OSN servers are down, users cannot
publish/retrieve keys/hash values and encrypt/decrypt/verify their emails. A
workaround is to have a locally backup of all keys and hash values on the user’s
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machine. Also in case of Facebook, using the post method3 limits Facebook
applications to only 25 posts per day to the user’s wall post on behalf of the
user. Therefore, FriendlyMail users cannot send more than 25 emails per day.




Conclusions and Future Work
Few corporations (e.g., Google, Microsoft) are becoming de-facto global communica-
tion middlemen, as more users are signing up for web-based email services. Besides
these corporations, governments are also trying to access the cloud stored email data
(see e.g., [77, 40]), ignoring privacy rights of global citizens. Providing crypto support
for email is apparently easy (e.g., several crypto primitives exist to enable authenti-
cation, confidentiality and integrity); however, key management is significantly more
challenging. We propose and implement FriendlyMail, focusing on key management
issues. We automate key generation and transport, by leveraging widely-used OSN
services and existing trust-relations among OSN users. Beyond email encryption,
such a key transport mechanism may enable privacy protection for additional user-to-
user data communication services (e.g., encrypted IMs, file sharing via public cloud).
FriendlyMail does not require any server-side modifications, and thus can be imme-
diately deployed. Although it enables secure email communications mainly between
OSN-connected users. In contrast, most other solutions target generic adoption, i.e.,
can support any sender and receiver. The collusion between OSN and email providers
could be real a concern. Our current implementation supports the web-based Gmail
service for users who are also connected via Facebook (as friends, or through the Like




Several points, specially regarding users’ perspective, may be considered in the future.
1. Collusion attacks between email and secondary channel providers are still a real
problem which requires further investigations.
2. FriendlyMail currently is limited to the basic email features. Further improve-
ments to the implementation are required to add the support for file attachment,
searching and archiving emails and key backup for better user acceptance.
3. Another future direction should be toward addressing the fact that how we can
make everyday users aware of email privacy issues and influence them using a
privacy-friendly solution. What benefits or desired features users would gain
(expect to have) by using these solutions, so that they consider using such a
privacy-friendly tool.
4. On the trust issue, further studies need to be done to figure out how to convince
users to build trust in privacy-enhanced systems; and make them understand
that their privacy is maintained and no personal information would leak through
the use of such tools. Despite the fact that FriendlyMail is developed as a fully
open-sourced tool, still average users do not have enough understanding of the
underlying code to verify it by themselves.
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To provide a more concrete understanding of tools and proposals discussed in Chap-
ter 2 and a comparative analysis, we adapt the recently-proposed UDS (Usability,
Deployability, Security) framework by Bonneau et al. [8]. We redefine each UDS fea-
tures of the framework, to fit it into our case of email security. We opt for usability
inspection methods of Nielsen’s heuristic evaluations [62, 64, 61], mostly because this
form of informal evaluation is useful in situations where conducting real user studies
is time consuming and costly. We extend this evaluation to deployability and security
aspects of secure email systems, based on the defined sets of heuristics, to form our
UDS framework. Note that, the framework and comparison, is still a work in progress.
It does not cover the evaluation and comparison of all previously mentioned tools and
proposals. Also, as evaluation of each tool is a time consuming process which requires
several careful tests, our evaluations might not be completely accurate. Additionally,
some proposals do not have an available tool for test. In these cases, we perform
analytical comparison instead.
A.1 Evaluation Framework
We define three sets of features: usability, deployability and security. Our usabil-
ity features are mostly based on five properties of security, presented by Whitten
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et al. [87], and the design and user interface usability principals of Gutmann [43],
Nielsen [62, 63] and Kainda et al. [47]. We define security features mostly based
on email security threat model and some properties of Whitten et al. and Kainda
et al. Our deployability features are more concerned about obtaining, installation,
and configuration of the software, which are mostly based on the two properties of:
unmotivated property and barn door property as stated by Whitten et al. Our us-
ability features are more related to the user interaction and communication with the
software, more specifically its user interface and the user’s tasks. These features and
their definitions are as follows.
A.1.1 Usability Features
U1 Matching-Users’-Mental-Model
Users’ security-related tasks and the UI presenting those tasks should be easily
conceivable, without requiring any knowledge or training about the security
concepts. Thus, the user can intuitively find out what task should be done to
achieve a specific goal.
Also, these tasks and their related UI, should not be complex to cause users
abandon the scheme. Using familiar metaphors, matching users’ mental model,
to represent the tasks along with familiar words/expressions, greatly helps users
to follow them.
As an example, based on the user test result by Whitten et al. [87], PGP 5.0 as
a PKI-based approach, does not match users’ mental model, as it is not obvious
to all users that to send an encrypted email to another party, the public key of
the recipient should be obtained in advance, or why they must have two keys,
instead of one, to have their emails protected.
U2 Transparent-Security-Tasks
As security of email is not the primary goal of email users, security tasks should
be as transparent as possible, and users should not be exposed to details of
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security tasks (e.g., like the use of SSL in browsers). Thus, most security-
related tasks should be done automatically, without involving the user into the
technical details.
U3 User-Control
Email encryption may not be always necessary, convenient or possible. This
feature has both usability and security effect and is considered as a both us-
ability and security-related feature. In order to avoid making users completely
abandon the scheme, or accidentally disclose their email content, users should
decide when to secure their emails and should be informed about the success
and failure of the security related tasks.
U4 Effortless-Key-Management
The scheme should employ an appropriate mechanism to reduce key manage-
ment efforts. Symmetric key encryption mechanisms and PGP, e.g., require
initial key establishment using a secure channel like phone or meeting in per-
son; therefore these schemes that do not offer this feature.
The scheme should also impose no burden on users to store, verify, and re-
voke keys. Schemes, not providing this benefit include: PKI-based ones, which
have no satisfactory solution to manage private keys, or any other scheme that
requires users to verify their keys manually.
We define a scheme as Partial-Effortless-Key-Management, in case that it fails
to provide one or more of automatic key generation, distribution, storage, veri-
fication, and revocation.
U5 Easy-Recovery-From-Loss
Users should be able to easily access their past encrypted emails, in case of key




The security-related tasks, should be completed in an acceptable amount of
time and effort. The number of button clicks or the time needed to complete
the whole task, should be minimal. These tasks should also be reliable to avoid
user frustration.
U7 Consistent-User-Experience
The scheme should be well integrated with the existing email work flow. The
scheme should not prevent users from performing their regular tasks e.g., reply-
ing, forwarding emails, multiple recipients or attachments. All required tasks
should be performed through familiar existing email client rather than a partic-
ular user interface provided by the scheme or external website/service. More-
over, the scheme should be designed and deployed for most platforms (e.g., web,
desktop, mobile client) supported by any email provider.
A scheme offering Quasi-Consistent-User-Experience benefit, preserves user ex-
perience of regular email work flow, but might not support some of the existing
email system features, such as searching by content. Moreover its design is not
restricted to a specific client or provider, yet has not been implemented for all
clients.
U8 Effective-Feedback-To-User
The scheme should notify users about its status, and the failure or the success of
any action it takes on the user’s behalf, using appropriate feedback in a timely
fashion. Error feedback should also explain both the cause of the problem
and possible solutions to users. Moreover, scheme status or error feedback
should be presented to users using simple yet effective messages. The scheme
should communicate with users through familiar words/expressions, including
less technically-heavy terms. These expressions should be consistent across the
whole system to avoid user confusion. Metaphors, symbols and visual cues can
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The scheme should not expect any cooperation or support from email service
providers. It should not require any changes to be made into email infrastruc-
ture, email providers’ MUAs (Mail User Agents) and policies or implementation
of new security systems by email providers. Email providers, especially free
services, have no incentives to make any changes or implement new security
mechanisms in their systems. The scheme also may not introduce additional
server-side components or employ any server, as server maintenance requires
some efforts while the scalability of these servers could be problematic which
can affect the availability of the scheme.
D2 Portable
Users are not limited to their primary computer and can use the scheme from
any other machines. Schemes that require special software to be installed with
administrative rights, or store keys or other sensitive information required in
their work flow on users’ machine, do not support mobility.
D3 Flexible
The scheme should be designed and implemented in a way that can satisfy
both technical and non-technical users. It should provide some options to more
experienced users to be able to customize the scheme to fit into their needs.
These options should also be configured to their safe default modes, to let




Any prior setup that causes burden or inconvenience to the sender or receiver, or
act as an obstacle to email encryption, degrades the deployability. For example,
secret keys or public keys that must be shared with the receiver, prevents the
sender from sending encrypted emails before the sharing of keys is done. Users
do not also need to install, configure, setup or register for additional software
or services, to get the scheme to work.
D5 Free-And-Open-Sourced
The details of the scheme and its source code are freely available to be used
for any purposes or adapted by anyone. Its source code should also be well-
documented, distributable and modifiable or derivable to be used in other
projects.
D6 Available-Implementation
The scheme has been implemented and used by people as an actual email secu-
rity solution rather than a simple research prototype or proposal. The imple-
mentation should also be reliable and up-to-date.
A.1.3 Security Features
S1 Confidentiality
The scheme employs appropriate methods such as encryption or steganography
to make the email entirely or partially (e.g., body, subject-line and attachments)
confidential. This protection should also be end-to-end; i.e., it is done at the
user client than the email server, gateway or a trusted third party, to remain
encrypted in transit and deliver encrypted, directly to the user’s email client.
For example, a trusted third party who automatically generates and maintains
keys while is in the possession of encrypted emails, has the ability to decrypt
and read or even modify emails at any time without users’ notice or consent.
It should also avoid content leakage to the email provider, e.g., while being
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written, or kept in user inbox.
A scheme rated as Partial-Confidentiality, does not provide end-to-end protec-
tion at the message level such as using SSL in webmail, opportunistic encryption
through gateways, etc. We also rate schemes that rely on non-colluding third
parties as Quasi-Confidentiality.
S2 Authentication
There should be a possible and intuitive method to verify keys and authenticate
an email sender and receiver mutually, to prevent attackers from impersonating
the sender or receiver of an email.
S3 Content-Modification-Detection
The scheme employs a method to verify email content integrity, with or without
confidentiality.
S4 Non-Repudiation
A scheme offers Non-Repudiation if there is a cryptographic proof to verify that
an email is sent from the one who claims to be the sender. In another word, in
the presence of such a proof, the sender cannot deny that a particular email has
been sent by her. Non-repudiation is generally achieved by digital signatures,
when, e.g., a certificate issued by a CA can be counted as a proof, as it binds
the identity of the sender to the key.
S5 Critical-Error-Prevention
The user interface should be carefully designed and implemented in a way that
initially prevents users from making any dangerous errors leading to critical
security exposures. This can be done by leaving no choice to make decision
by users in critical conditions and making all critical processes automatic. It
should not also rely on the direct user attention to the details of each task, to
achieve the security goals of the system. Moreover, if any error occurs during
86
the process, an appropriate and non-confusing feedback, describing the current
process status, should be presented to the user. A problematic case regarding
this feature could be any scheme not informing users properly about encryption
failure and sends it anyways with no feedback, or a scheme that decrypts an
email automatically before reaching to the receiver’s inbox, leaving the scheme
vulnerable to the phishing attacks.
S6 Robust-Against-Secret-Key-Exposure
Compromised secret keys, used for encryption, should have limited effects on
the security of the system. In other words, disclosure of a key may limit the
exposure of future or previous past email communications . For example, in the
case of disclosure of a key with per-message keys, the confidentiality of all email
content are protected, other than the one encrypted by the compromised key.
This feature makes the process of interception of all emails difficult and costly
for attackers.
A.2 Evaluation and Comparison
In this section, we evaluate FriendlyMail and some previously discussed proposals/
tools in Chapter 2, using the UDS features presented in Section A.1. The summary
of evaluations and comparisons are presented in Figure 3.
We modify the original UDS framework, by defining five levels of rating: Full-
benefit, Quasi-benefit, Partial-benefit, Not-Applicable-benefit and No-benefit. A
scheme is rated to provide partial-benefit, if it offers the feature partially, between
no-benefit and full-benefit. Quasi, refers to the case that a scheme almost offers the
feature, e.g., in case where no scheme can completely satisfy a particular feature.
Finally, we rate a scheme as Not-Applicable (N/A) if a feature is not discussed, im-
plemented or cannot be tested. As our user interface usability ratings are not based
on usability studies on everyday email users, we rely on our own tests through the use
of the tools (if available), and on our understanding of the schemes and the provided
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specifications.
A.2.1 UDS Evaluation of FriendlyMail
FriendlyMail apparently offers Matching-Users’-Mental-Model, Transparent-Security-
Tasks, and Efficient-To-Use. The underlying concept of symmetric encryption is
quite easy to understand compared to PKI. Steps to be followed by a FriendlyMail
user includes: logging into OSN accounts, selecting the sender/receiver’s OSN ac-
count from a provided list of OSN friends, and deciding when to send a secure email
(different modes of operation, e.g., confidentiality vs. integrity-only). It also inte-
grates the receiver’s OSN photo and basic information, as an intuitive way of identity
verification. All security-related tasks are represented via a minimal and intuitive
user interface, implemented and explained through the use of visual cues and famil-
iar expressions, while technical security tasks are completely transparent to users.
Moreover, automatic encryption/decryption, integrity check and loading email con-
tent are reasonably fast and imperceptible, which would not frustrate the user; see
Section 5.2. Providing users with different options for securing email and several feed-
back on the state of the performed tasks also satisfies the benefit of User-Control. It
is Key-Management-Effortless ; see Section 4.4 under “Automatic key management”.
Key revocation is not applicable. Keys/hash values are optionally and automatically
backed up locally, in the case when a key/hash value is deleted from the OSN, satis-
fying Easy-Recovery-From-Loss. FriendlyMail secures regular email tasks e.g., reply,
forward and multiple recipients. Also the transparency of technical tasks, minimal
UI and user involvement, preserve the same user experience as with the regular email
work flow. Yet, it provides Quasi-Consistent-User-Experience, as still no promising
solution has been designed or implemented for email content searching, backup, etc.
It also provides Effective-Feedback-To-User ; see Section 5.2 under “Visual cues and
security statements”.
The deployment of FriendlyMail is fairly easy. It satisfies No-Prior-Setup-For-
User, since it requires no prior setup or installation of additional software except
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the plug-in. The sender can also send an encrypted email, even if the receiver does
not have the shared key or the plug-in installed on his system in advance. However,
FriendlyMail requires both the sender and receiver to be connected in a common
OSN, we believe it does not prevent users from using our tool, as we are leveraging
existing services rather than asking users to register for a completely new one. In
addition, our integrity check mechanism does not require such existing OSN relation-
ships. Moreover, no specific or complex configuration is needed for a normal user. It
is Flexible, as it provides more technical users with an advanced option of using their
own keys. It is Free-And-Open-Sourced and offers Partial-Available-Implementation,
as it is still an academic prototype, but publicly available. FriendlyMail satisfies
Quasi-No-Server-Side-Changes, as it depends on the OSN services, but does not need
additional components. Current implementation of FriendlyMail through Facebook
also limits its availability in countries where accessing Facebook is blocked. However,
this limitation can be addressed to some extent by extending the implementation via
several OSNs.
FriendlyMail offers security features of Quasi-Confidentiality, as in certain cases
collusion attack cannot be avoided. Non repudiation is not a goal for Friendly-
Mail. Therefore, we rate it as Not-Applicable-Non-Repudiation. It offers Content-
Modification-Detection, Critical-Error-Prevention. However, it provides Quasi-
authentication, as it relies on the existing pre-authenticated connections among friends
on Facebook. This still leaves FriendlyMail vulnerable to impersonation attack, due
to the existence of fake accounts. Per-message key approach offers Robust-To-Secret-
Key-Exposure. See Section 6.1 for details.
A.2.2 UDS Evaluation of Other Proposals/Tools
1. Enigmail
Enigmail uses OpenPGP, therefore is rated as not offering Matching-Users’-
Mental-Model, Transparent-Security-Tasks ; as it is already discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.1, the perception of the public/private key concept is difficult for users.
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Trust in Web of Trust is another issue, which is not intuitive for average users,
specially when it comes to decide about the trustworthiness of others, who are
not in the user’s close circle. Users should generate a pair of public/private
key, a revocation certificate and a passphrase. Users also should manually store
their revocation certificate and passphrase in a safe place and distribute their
public keys and verify other users’ public keys. Moreover, as most key man-
agement tasks are on users, it does not offer Effortless-Key-Management. It
satisfies User-Control, as users can choose when to sign or encrypt their emails
and will be notified about the failure or success of the task. It does not offer
Easy-Recovery-From-Loss, as users should create a revocation certificate, store
it in a secure place to be later used to revoke their public key, in case when
their secret key is lost or compromised. Moreover, if the keys are lost, past
encrypted email cannot be decrypted anymore. However, it is Efficient-To-Use;
signing and encryption/decryption are completely automatic and users should
just send their email as sending a regular email and pay attention to some se-
curity notifications. Although it keeps asking users to enter their secret key for
several times to decrypt and verify an email, even if it is configured to remember
the secret key for that session, which could be annoying to users. It also offers
Quasi-Consistent-User-Experience; it is completely integrated into the UI and
supports all the basic email tasks, except searching email content. Finally it
provides Effective-Feedback-To-User, using different colors, several visual cues,
along with security statements.
Enigmail is rated as No-Server-Side-Changes, as Enigmail by itself does not re-
quire additional servers, although for key distribution in large scale, key servers
are largely used. It is not also Portable, as users should carry their private key
from one machine to another. It is Flexible, as advanced options are presented
to expert users and the default settings are all configured to the safe options.
However, it does not offer No-Prior-Setup-For-Users, as users need to have
PGP installed on their machine in addition to the Enigmail extension and also
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obtain the recipient’s public key before encrypting an email for that recipient.
They also have to perform several initial configurations that may not be easy
or convenient for all users, e.g., key generation may take few minutes and users
should backup their key, create revocation certificates and passphrases, etc. It
is Free-And-Open-Sourced and has Available-Implementation.
It provides Confidentiality using OpenPGP, Authentication through certifi-
cates and Web of Trust, Content-Modification-Detection and Non-Repudiation
through digital signatures. Visual cues representing encryption may not be suf-
ficient, as the icon enabling encryption is not quite noticeable, and no other
cues such as color have been used, to make sure that users will notice when
their email will be encrypted. Thus, it might make users to send a sensitive
email without noticing that encryption is not enabled, and cannot be rated as
Critical-Error-Prevention. Moreover, disclosure of the private key exposes all
previously encrypted emails; however, timely key revocation prevents the dis-
closure of future encrypted emails. Thus, it is rated as Partial-Robust-Against-
Secret-Key-Exposure.
2. Waterhouse
As the tool is not available for test, we rate the scheme’s usability features
based on their presented mock up and cognitive walkthrough methods [49, 50].
It is Partial-Matching-Users’-Mental-Model, by avoiding technical terms, and
simplifying trust model. Trust is formed among pre-authenticated friend con-
nections on Facebook and displaying Facebook pictures of sender/receiver acts
as a proof of trust to users. Yet, it uses the same notion of public/private
keys which is not familiar to average users. It provides Partial-Transparent-
Security-Tasks, as all security tasks, e.g., signing, encryption/decryption and
public key distribution are automatic and hidden from users, except private key
storage and backup. Therefore it also gives Partial-Effortless-Key-Management,
but not Easy-Recovery-From-Loss, same as PGP. It secures emails by default
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among Facebook friends. However, users have the option to cancel any protec-
tion for their emails. Therefore, it gives User-Control. Since encryption and
decryption are transparent and its user interface is minimal and tasks are com-
pletely integrated with email client, it is considered to be Efficient-To-Use and
it is rated as Quasi-Consistent-User-Experience, mainly due to the searching
email content issue. Also as we have not tested the tool we suppose they have
secured other basic email tasks as well. It also gives Effective-Feedback-To-Users
through several visual cues and security statements.
Same as FriendlyMail it is rated as Quasi-No-Server-Changes and Portable, as
it depends on the availability of Facebook service and, users should carry their
private keys to be able to switch between different machines. It is not rated
as Not-Applicable-Flexible, as no customization is discussed. It does not offer
No-Prior-Setup-For-User, as the tool should be installed on both sides to share
public keys before having any secure communication. Its tool and source code
are not available, not to the public or for test, making it non-Free-And-Open-
Sourced and non-Available-Implementation.
From security perspective, it resembles PGP security to some extent. It provides
Confidentiality, Content-Modification-Detection and Non-Repudiation, through
encryption and signing using PGP. As FriendlyMail, their approach provides
Quasi-Authentication, as it trusts users’ pre-authenticated connections. Based
on their own heuristic evaluation [49], again as tool is not available for the
test, we rate it as Critical-Error-Prevention. It is Partial-Robust-To-Secret-Key-
Exposure, as if a private key is compromised, it is revoked and new key pairs
are generated and distributed to limit the damage. Although the process is not
automatic, and it is on users to revoke their compromised key. This may lead
to the exposure of larger number of encrypted emails, where the compromised
key is not revoked immediately after disclosure.
3. TrustSplit
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TrustSplit’s simple design (using symmetric key), incorporation of different col-
ors as visual cues, and familiar users’ tasks including: an initial registration for
an online service and entering a password for user authentication (see [31]) sat-
isfies Matching-Users’-Mental-Model. It is rated as Transparent-Security-Tasks ;
it encrypts all emails by default (if possible), and asks users to decide whether
to send it in plaintext or do not send it at all, in case where encryption is
not possible. Thus, it offers User-Control. It provides Partial-Effortless-Key-
Management, as encryption/decryption and key management are transparently
handled. However, the scheme still requires users to create, remember or store
an extra password of their CaaS account (which should also be different than
their email account’s password). It offers Easy-Recovery-From-Loss using their
CaaS service. It is Efficient-To-Use and Quasi-Consistent-User-Experience, as
it is well integrated into the email client UI and main security tasks are trans-
parent; users should just enter their password few times (each session), click a
button for sending secure emails and notice security indicators, while the whole
encryption/decryption are done in a relatively acceptable time [30]. However,
searching email content is not addressed. It offers Effective-Feedback-To-Users
using red/green message borders to inform users about the success/failure of
the tasks or locks as the symbol of a secure email.
It is not No-Server-Side-Changes, as it employs CaaS service. It is not Flexible
but Portable assuming the user can memorize the CaaS password and use it
from any machine. It does not offer No-Priory-Setup-For-User, as it requires
the sender and receiver to register to the CaaS service before using the tool. It
is Free-And-Open-Sourced, but not Available-Implementation for email client.
It provides Quasi-Confidentiality and Content-Modification-Detection of email
body and attachments. It does not offer Authentication, as verification through
email (Email-Based Authentication and Identification) is not authentication of
real identity. As its tool is not available for testing (for email client), we rate
it as Non-Applicable-Critical-Error-Prevention. Although if an email cannot
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be encrypted, it asks user if they prefer to send it unencrypted, which may
accidentally lead to disclosure of sensitive content by the user. It also satisfies
Robust-To-Secret-Key-Exposure, because of using random keys per message. Fi-
nally, it does not offer Non-Repudiation, as it does not use digital signatures.
4. Aquinas
Steganography and secret sharing concepts are quite simple. The security-
related user’s tasks, e.g., providing email accounts information and exchang-
ing a secret are also somewhat intuitive. However, due to the requirement of
multiple accounts, Aquinas offers Partial-Matching-Users’-Mental-Model. How-
ever, it is rated as non-Transparent-Security-Task and Partial-Effortless-Key-
Management, as users should decide which covertext to use for steganography;
the sender should choose and share a secret with the receiver through a secure
channel and store it securely. These tasks are non-trivial specially for non-
technical users. It offers User-Control, as encryption is not done automatically.
It is non-Easy-Recovery-From-Loss, as there is no automatic key recovery. It is
not Efficient-To-Use; users should do several additional tasks other that just
composing an email; they should choose a covertext and input email accounts
used for key and email transmission. The initial configuration is also non-
trivial, if users want to use the scheme on different machines. It does not offer
Consistent-User-Experience; it is not integrated into an existing email client.
We also rate it as Not-Applicable-Efficient-Feedback-To-User.
Aquinas is No-Server-Side-Changes and Portable; it is a standalone Java ap-
plet that can be accessed through the Internet and possibly be used on every
machine. It is Flexible as users can set the number of email accounts they want
to use to secure their email. Basic Aquinas does not offer No-Prior-Setup-For-
Users ; if bogus accounts are used, initial secret sharing is necessary. Also users
should add their email accounts into a public database to make them available
to the other users. It is Free-And-Open-Sourced and Available-Implementation.
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It offers Confidentiality and Content-Modification-Detection using (Message Au-
thentication Code) MAC. It does not offer Authentication as it is on users to
authenticate each other, specially when they add their email accounts to a public
database to make it available to other users, there is no way to authenticate and
bind email addresses with users identity. It does not also offer Non-Repudiation
as it does not employ digital signatures and the secret is shared between both
sender and receiver, thus a particular email can be sent by both of them. It
does not offer Critical-Error-Prevention as some security-related tasks rely on
users’ choice and knowledge, e.g., covertexts should be carefully chosen. It is
Robust-Against-Secret-Key-Exposure; as per-message keys are used for encryp-
tion, and different subset of email accounts can be used for key or email shares
transmission.
5. SPEmail
The main motivations of this approach are eliminating the need for any en-
cryption and key management through secret sharing. We rate SPEmail as
Partial-Matching-Users’-Mental-Model and Transparent-Security-Task, mainly
because the concept of secret sharing and hiding data through stegonagraphy
is relatively intuitive; however it requires multiple accounts. No security tasks
are also on users. There is no key management, thus it is both Effortless-Key-
Management and Easy-Recovery-From-Loss. It satisfies User-Control ; users can
secure their email when it is desired and they are notified in case of failure. It
is not considered as Efficient-To-Use, as all the steps of sending a secure email
are automatically performed by the tool. However, the user should provide two
email addresses and their corresponding passwords into the FROM field and two
email addresses into the TO field. Moreover, the second email address of every
recipient could not be trivially obtained or known. SPEmail is well integrated
into the email UI; but does not support searching email content, attachments
or multiple recipients. Thus, it offers Partial-Consistent-User-Experience. We
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also rate it as Not-Applicable-Efficient-Feedback-To-User, as we could not test
the tool.
It is No-Server-Side-Changes and Portable; but not Flexible; as no customiza-
tion is provided. Its current implementation for Gmail, requires several initial
setups, such as installing Greasemonkey Firefox addon, Java Virtual Machine
(JVM), accessing a webmail account specifically dedicated to work with the tool.
Therefore, it is not No-Prior-Setup-For-User. It is Free-And-Open-Sourced,
while currently there is no reliable working Available-Implementation.
It offers Quasi-Confidentiality except for the attachments (although auto sav-
ings drafts does not seem to work properly), and it requires non-colluding email
providers; but does not provide Content-Modification-Detection. However, au-
thors suggest an approach, by sending a hashed random number, bound to
each secured communication along with a timestamp, to provide integrity ver-
ification. It does not offer Authentication and Non-Repudiation as well. It is
rated as Not-Applicable-Critical-Error-Prevention, as the tool is not available


























































































































































































































































































































FriendlyMail       G#  G#     # G# G#     
Enigmail [56]   G#          #
Waterhouse [50] # #  #  G#  G#   G#    #
TrustSplit [30, 31]    #   G#    G#    
Aquinas [10] #  #          
SPEmail [66, 80] #     G#     G#   
Table 3: UDS evaluation of schemes. Key:  (offers the benefit); G# (almost offers the
benefit);# (offers partial benefit); – (benefit is not applicable); blank (benefit is not offered).
Note that, this table is an approximate analytical comparison. For more details, refer to
the detailed discussion and analysis of each scheme, provided in Section A.2.
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